Restoration of appeal for non-prosecution allowed where notice service was unproved and delay was bona fide explained.

An appeal dismissed for non-prosecution should be restored where service of the hearing notice is not proved, the appellant had informed a change of address, and earlier counsel had died, disrupting communication. The record also showed compliance with the Tribunal's pre-deposit and bank guarantee directions, so alleged non-compliance could not sustain dismissal. Delay in seeking restoration was excused because the appellant bona fide believed the appeal was still pending, supported by the department's demand to renew the bank guarantee. The High Court upheld restoration and directed that the appeal be decided on merits.

---

---

Issues: Whether the appeal dismissed for non-prosecution should be restored despite the alleged delay in seeking restoration, the alleged non-compliance with the pre-deposit and bank guarantee directions, and the alleged service of hearing notice under Rule 20 of the CEGAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982.

Analysis: The record showed compliance with the Tribunal's directions requiring pre-deposit and furnishing of a bank guarantee within time. The dismissal for non-prosecution was also found unsustainable because service of the hearing notice on the petitioner was not established, the petitioner had notified a change of address, and the earlier counsel had died, causing a breakdown in communication. The delay in moving the restoration application was explained by the petitioner's bona fide belief that the appeal remained pending, reinforced by the departmental demand to renew the bank guarantee.

Conclusion: The Tribunal ought to have recalled the dismissal order and restored the appeal for decision on merits; the restoration application was rightly allowed.

Ratio Decidendi: A restoration application should be allowed where dismissal for non-prosecution rests on unproved service and alleged non-compliance, and the delay is explained by bona fide circumstances showing that the appellant reasonably believed the appeal was still pending.

---