Limitation for excise appeal may exclude time spent in mandatory High Powered Committee clearance process.

Time spent by a public sector undertaking in approaching the High Powered Committee for clearance before filing an appeal may be excluded when computing limitation, because participation in that judicially recognised in-house conciliation mechanism is not treated as default on the appellant's part. The text states that, although the appeal period under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 included a further condonable period, the appellant was pursuing the mandatory dispute-resolution process between the Union and public sector undertakings. On those facts, the delay was required to be condoned and the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was maintainable for consideration on merits.

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Issues: (i) Whether the time spent by a public sector undertaking in approaching the High Powered Committee for clearance before filing the appeal was liable to be excluded while computing limitation for the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals).

Analysis: The appeal could have been filed within the statutory period prescribed under Section 35 of the Central Excise Act, 1944, with a further condonable period, but the appellant was bound by the judicially recognised mechanism requiring prior approach to the High Powered Committee in disputes between the Union and public sector undertakings. Since the appellant was pursuing that compulsory in-house conciliation process, the period spent therein could not be treated as a default on its part. On the facts, the delay was therefore liable to be condoned and the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) could not be rejected as time-barred.

Conclusion: The delay was rightly required to be condoned, and the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) was maintainable for decision on merits.

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