Issues: (i) Whether the availability and filing of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment was challenged for breach of natural justice; (ii) Whether the faceless assessment order was vitiated by non-consideration of authenticated replies, inadequate time to respond to the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective personal hearing.

Issue (i): Whether the availability and filing of a statutory appeal barred exercise of writ jurisdiction where the assessment was challenged for breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The appellate remedy had been invoked only to preserve limitation. Availability of an alternate remedy is a rule of self-restraint and does not preclude writ jurisdiction where the impugned action is affected by violation of principles of natural justice.

Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the pending statutory appeal, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the faceless assessment order was vitiated by non-consideration of authenticated replies, inadequate time to respond to the show-cause notice, and denial of an effective personal hearing.

Analysis: The acknowledgements containing hash values authenticated the responses under Section 144B(6)(xii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The replies filed in response to the notice under Section 142(1) and the show-cause notice were disregarded despite their authenticated submission. The show-cause notice afforded effectively only two working days, contrary to the prescribed minimum period of seven days. Although the technical failure affecting the video-conference hearing was notified, no fresh hearing was offered before the assessment was completed.

Conclusion: The assessment was rendered invalid for gross breach of principles of natural justice, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment must be undertaken afresh from the show-cause stage after considering the assessee's replies and providing any required further opportunity and an effective personal hearing before an adverse determination.

Ratio Decidendi: An assessment completed without considering authenticated responses and without affording a meaningful opportunity to respond and be heard violates principles of natural justice and is amenable to writ jurisdiction despite an alternate remedy.

Issues: (i) Whether the undertaking was eligible for deduction under section 80-IE despite its acquisition from an associated concern and the allegation that old or used plant and machinery exceeded the permissible limit; (ii) Whether section 80-IE(6) read with section 80-IA(10) justified notional allocation of selling and distribution, research and development, royalty, management and other expenses, or further disallowance of remuneration to the working partner, while computing eligible profits; (iii) Whether the central excise duty incentive was includible in eligible profits for deduction under section 80-IE.

Issue (i): Whether the undertaking was eligible for deduction under section 80-IE despite its acquisition from an associated concern and the allegation that old or used plant and machinery exceeded the permissible limit.

Analysis: Section 80-IE(3) requires that the eligible undertaking must not be formed by splitting up or reconstruction of an existing business and must not be formed by transfer of previously used plant or machinery beyond the permitted threshold. The concurrent factual findings established that the undertaking was transferred while under construction, commercial production commenced thereafter, and the change was confined to ownership of the undertaking. The material did not establish splitting up or reconstruction. The Revenue also failed to make supplier-level enquiry to support its presumption that machinery treated as old was previously used; duplicate bills, photocopies, or unavailable lorry receipts did not by themselves establish use of the machinery. The reconciled evidence did not show that old or used machinery exceeded 20 per cent of the total plant and machinery.

Conclusion: The undertaking satisfied the conditions for deduction under section 80-IE, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether section 80-IE(6) read with section 80-IA(10) justified notional allocation of selling and distribution, research and development, royalty, management and other expenses, or further disallowance of remuneration to the working partner, while computing eligible profits.

Analysis: Section 80-IA(10), as applied through section 80-IE(6), permits re-computation only where the course of business between closely connected persons is so arranged as to yield more than ordinary profits to the eligible undertaking. Although a close connection existed, no reliable evidence established such an arrangement or that the associated concern had actually borne the assessee's expenses. General statements recorded during survey without oath had only corroborative value and were subsequently retracted. A turnover-based comparison of expenses, without verification of the actual distribution network, business operations, or expenses incurred for the assessee, could not support notional allocation. The royalty and management-fee adjustments were also unwarranted where remuneration had been provided to the working partner for the facilities extended, and no further adjustment was supported. No double disallowance of remuneration was permissible after the assessee had itself added back the amount in its revised return.

Conclusion: No notional expense allocation, further reduction of eligible profits, or additional disallowance of working-partner remuneration was warranted under section 80-IA(10), in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the central excise duty incentive was includible in eligible profits for deduction under section 80-IE.

Analysis: The applicable incentive scheme was directed at industrial development and employment generation in the concerned area. The incentive accordingly bore the character of a capital receipt rather than a production or trade receipt. Its exclusion from taxable income necessarily required its exclusion from computation of eligible profits under section 80-IE; the resulting treatment was tax-neutral because the deduction otherwise available was at 100 per cent.

Conclusion: The central excise duty incentive is a capital receipt and must be excluded from both total income and eligible profits for section 80-IE purposes, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee's entitlement to the section 80-IE deduction and the computation of its eligible profits were sustained, with the excise incentive excluded as a capital receipt.

Ratio Decidendi: Re-computation of profits under section 80-IA(10) requires cogent evidence of an arrangement producing more than ordinary profits; a close connection and turnover-based presumptions alone are insufficient.

Issues: Whether the assessee's international transaction of purchase of services for resale could be characterised as provision of information technology enabled services for transfer-pricing purposes.

Analysis: The characterisation as an information technology enabled service provider was affirmed without cogent reasons and without examining the assessee's functions, assets and risks or explaining the departure from the earlier characterisation despite no material change in facts. Although the Advance Pricing Agreement did not cover the relevant assessment year, its examination of the functional profile, acceptance of the Transactional Net Margin Method and reseller characterisation were relevant material for fresh consideration. The Assessing Officer was directed to examine the assessee's characterisation, consider the Advance Pricing Agreement terms if reasonably applicable, or otherwise determine the arm's length price on the basis of the transfer-pricing study and applicable law.

Conclusion: The characterisation of the assessee as an information technology enabled service provider was set aside, and the transfer-pricing issue was restored for fresh adjudication.

Issues: (i) Whether the claimed loss was a genuine business loss arising from business carried on during the relevant year; (ii) Whether interest on borrowings used for acquiring shares in another company was allowable on grounds of commercial expediency; (iii) Whether disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could exceed the exempt income earned, and whether the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 applied retrospectively; (iv) Whether the deletion of the addition for share capital under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable where the funds were allegedly routed through group entities.

Issue (i): Whether the claimed loss was a genuine business loss arising from business carried on during the relevant year.

Analysis: Allowability of a business loss requires genuine business activity. The advisory-fee receipt and corresponding expenditure arose under back-to-back, mirror-image agreements between group entities, executed on the same date for identical services. The assessee did not establish independent provision of services, infrastructure, or commercial activity; the entries were recorded through year-end journal entries without actual fund movement. The arrangement lacked commercial substance and constituted a colourable device to create the appearance of business activity.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue. The claimed loss was not allowable as a business loss.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on borrowings used for acquiring shares in another company was allowable on grounds of commercial expediency.

Analysis: Section 36(1)(iii) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits interest deduction only for capital borrowed for the purposes of business or profession. Commercial expediency required a demonstrated business nexus between the borrowed funds, the acquisition of shares, and the assessee's business. The record did not establish that the investee was a subsidiary at the relevant time, that the assessee had a deep commercial interest in it, or that acquiring its shares served the assessee's business. The acquisition was therefore not shown to be commercially expedient.

Conclusion: In favour of Revenue. The interest disallowance was sustained.

Issue (iii): Whether disallowance under Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could exceed the exempt income earned, and whether the Explanation inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 applied retrospectively.

Analysis: The Explanation to Section 14A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 inserted by the Finance Act, 2022 was applied prospectively. For the relevant assessment year, disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income-tax Rules, 1962 could not exceed the exempt income earned. The amount of exempt income nevertheless required verification.

Conclusion: In favour of assessee. The disallowance is limited to the exempt income actually earned, subject to verification.

Issue (iv): Whether the deletion of the addition for share capital under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was sustainable where the funds were allegedly routed through group entities.

Analysis: Under Section 68 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the assessee must establish the identity and creditworthiness of the subscriber and the genuineness of the transaction. Although the subscriber's identity was established, same-day transfers showed that substantially identical sums moved from the subscriber to the assessee, onward to another group entity, and back to the subscriber. The assessee did not explain the application of the share-capital funds or the purpose and manner of these circular transactions. Genuineness, a necessary limb of the statutory test, remained unverified.

Conclusion: The deletion of the share-capital addition was set aside, and the issue was restored for fresh examination after affording opportunity to the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The business-loss claim and interest deduction were denied; the disallowance relating to exempt income was confined to the verified exempt income; and the share-capital credit requires a fresh determination on genuineness.

Issues: Whether consideration received by a statutory development authority for leasing or renting land, including lease premium and ground rent, and for sports-complex membership and subscription services, is exempt from service tax as a sovereign or statutory function.

Analysis: Section 65(105)(zzzz) of the Finance Act, 1994 covers leasing and other arrangements permitting use of immovable property for business or commerce. For the post-negative-list period, the activity falls within the definition of service under Section 65B(44) and is not covered by the negative list under Section 66D. Statutory status does not itself exclude an authority from service-tax liability where it undertakes commercial activity for consideration. The protection available to mandatory statutory functions applies only where the collection is a compulsory statutory levy deposited into the Government treasury; rent, lease premium, ground rent, membership charges and subscription charges received for the relevant activities are consideration and not such statutory levies. Lease premium or salami received for leasing immovable property is taxable, and sports-complex membership and subscription activity is commercial rather than sovereign.

Conclusion: The leasing or renting receipts and sports-complex membership and subscription charges are taxable services and are not exempt as sovereign or statutory functions; the finding is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether leasing of dialysis equipment constituted a deemed sale involving transfer of the right to use goods, or a taxable declared service.

Analysis: Article 366(29A)(d) of the Constitution of India excludes from service tax a transaction that transfers the right to use goods. Under Sections 65B(44)(a)(ii) and 66E(f) of the Finance Act, 1994, hiring or leasing without such transfer remains a service. The applicable test requires that the transferee obtain a legal and exclusive right to use the identified goods, to the exclusion of the owner. The lease terms retained material control with the owner: equipment use was subject to prescribed specifications and approval, the owner bore maintenance and insurance costs, retained inspection rights, and the equipment could not be removed without its consent. Payment of VAT did not alter the character of the transaction.

Conclusion: The lease did not transfer the right to use the equipment and was a taxable declared service.

Issues: Whether an applicant claiming GST budgetary support must be afforded an opportunity to explain an apparent discrepancy between its declaration and the Chartered Accountant certificate before its claim is concluded.

Analysis: The declaration stated a higher input tax credit figure than the Chartered Accountant certificate furnished at the respondents' direction. The certificate disclosed the figure claimed to be the actual eligible credit, yet the proceedings were concluded by relying on the declaration without seeking an explanation for the discrepancy. The absence of a specific provision permitting post-filing revision did not dispense with the obligation to act fairly where the discrepancy was apparent from the record. A declaration is not invariably conclusive where the claimant asserts an error and seeks to substantiate it with supporting material.

Conclusion: The applicant was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to explain and substantiate the alleged error in the declaration before the claim could validly be concluded.

Issues: Whether the petitioner's cancelled GST registration could be considered for revocation upon filing the pending returns and fulfilling statutory requirements.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to apply for revocation within one week, and the respondents were directed to promptly communicate any required compliance and consider revocation after such compliance.

Issues: (i) Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants; (ii) Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable; (iii) Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether drawback of Rs. 1,810/- with interest was recoverable from the appellants.

Analysis: Drawback processing through the Indian Customs EDI System credits the sanctioned amount to the bank account of the IEC holder reflected in the shipping bill. Since no shipping bill was filed using the appellants' IEC, no drawback could have been credited to them. Recovery of wrongly paid drawback is an execution process and may be undertaken, with applicable interest, only if evidence establishes that drawback was actually paid to them.

Conclusion: Drawback and interest were not recoverable from the appellants in the absence of evidence that any drawback had been paid to them.

Issue (ii): Whether penalties under Section 114(iii) of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: A penalty under Section 114 requires an act or omission rendering goods liable to confiscation under Section 113. Goods that have already been taken out of India cease to be "export goods" within Section 2(19) and become exported goods. Section 113 permits confiscation only of export goods; therefore, the finding that the already exported garments were liable to confiscation could not be sustained.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114(iii) were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Section 114AA of the Customs Act, 1962 were sustainable.

Analysis: Section 114AA requires knowing or intentional making, signing, using, or causing the use of a materially false or incorrect declaration, statement, or document. The false shipping bills were filed by the freight forwarder using another entity's IEC. The record did not establish that the appellants made any customs declaration or document, or possessed knowledge or intent concerning the false documents.

Conclusion: The penalties under Section 114AA were unsustainable and were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The drawback recovery and the impugned penalties lacked the necessary factual and statutory foundation.

Issues: Whether the interest on the balance financial debt, fixed at 9% per annum in the final insolvency appellate judgment, should be substituted by the contractual default rate of 3% per month.

Analysis: Rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 preserves inherent powers but does not warrant reopening a final adjudication merely to reach a different conclusion on facts already considered. The prior direction fixing interest at 9% per annum was a conscious exercise of judicial discretion after accounting for repayment of the entire principal and a substantial part of interest. Although contractual terms ordinarily bind the parties, the relief in proceedings under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must accord with the insolvency-resolution objective and cannot convert closed insolvency proceedings into a mechanism for recovery of disputed enhanced contractual interest. A default rate of 3% per month, producing a substantially enlarged claim after discharge of principal, was disproportionate in the circumstances. Liberty to seek modification did not itself establish entitlement to modification.

Conclusion: The contractual default interest of 3% per month was not substituted for the judicially fixed interest of 9% per annum on the balance amount.

Issues: (i) Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance; (ii) Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Issue (i): Whether post-CIRP transfers from the corporate debtor's bank account to recipients for pre-CIRP work violated the moratorium and warranted remittance.

Analysis: The transfers were admittedly made after commencement of CIRP and during the moratorium, without the Resolution Professional's knowledge. The bank records established that funds credited to the corporate debtor were subsequently transferred to the appellant. Publication of the CIRP commencement and the statutory public announcement gave rise to deemed knowledge of the moratorium. The assertion that the funds were held in trust was unsupported, as no trust relationship or identifiable trust fund was established. The fact that underlying work related to a pre-CIRP period did not validate a post-moratorium disposition of the corporate debtor's assets.

Conclusion: The transfers violated the moratorium under Section 14(1)(b), and the direction to remit the amount with interest was valid, against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged availability of the former remedy under Section 74 barred recourse to the Tribunal's jurisdiction for enforcing the moratorium.

Analysis: The contention based on Section 74 had neither been urged before the adjudicating authority nor raised as a ground in appeal. Further, Section 74 had been omitted with effect from 06.04.2026. In any event, the contention did not displace the established fact of transactions undertaken during the moratorium or invalidate recourse to enforce the statutory prohibition.

Conclusion: The former Section 74 remedy did not bar recourse under Sections 60(5) and 14(1)(b), against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The recovery directions enforcing the moratorium over the corporate debtor's assets remain legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A post-CIRP transfer of the corporate debtor's funds during a subsisting moratorium is prohibited unless a legally established exception applies; pre-CIRP origin of the underlying transaction and an unproved claim of trust do not remove the transfer from the moratorium.

Issues: Whether a CIRP admitted under Section 9 can be closed by the Appellate Tribunal on the basis of a settlement reached after admission, before constitution of the Committee of Creditors.

Analysis: The settlement was executed after commencement of CIRP and expressly recognised that closure was subject to compliance with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The amended Section 12A imposes a non obstante statutory framework for withdrawal of an admitted application and bars withdrawal before constitution of the Committee of Creditors. The authorities relied upon concerned settlements completed before admission of CIRP and predated or did not attract the amended statutory position.

Conclusion: The post-admission settlement could not justify closure of CIRP in the appeal; the IRP may seek withdrawal before the Adjudicating Authority under Section 12A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Issues: Whether interest on refund of a pre-deposit under Section 35FF is payable for the entire period from the date of deposit until the actual refund, including the period attributable to the appellant's delay in seeking refund.

Analysis: Section 35FF of the Central Excise Act, 1944 mandates interest on a pre-deposit required to be refunded consequent to an appellate order, running from the date of payment until the date of refund. The provision does not qualify this entitlement by reference to the cause of delay in refund. Although the appellant delayed for over five years in furnishing the High Court judgment and seeking refund, the statutory language governs regardless of hardship, fairness, neglect, or the party responsible for the intervening delay.

Conclusion: Interest under Section 35FF is payable to the appellant for the entire period from the date of pre-deposit until the date of actual refund, including the period of delay attributable to the appellant.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory welfare board facilitating deployment of ex-servicemen as guards to banks, without profit or commercial activity, provides taxable security agency service.

Analysis: The appellant was constituted under statute to undertake welfare activities for ex-servicemen. It merely facilitated deployment of guards and collected remuneration for onward payment to them, without earning profit or carrying on commercial business. Fees collected by a public authority in discharge of statutory functions were not liable to service tax. The activity did not satisfy either the definition of security agency or the taxable category of security agency service.

Conclusion: The appellant did not render taxable security agency service; the demand was unsustainable on merits, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for recovery of service tax.

Analysis: The finding that the appellant acted under a bona fide belief arising from legal interpretation, which justified waiver of penalty, negated the ingredients required for the extended period. Revenue did not establish fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement, suppression of facts, or contravention with intent to evade tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demands fail both because the activity was outside the taxable security-agency category and because the extended limitation period was unavailable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory welfare body which merely facilitates deployment of personnel and passes remuneration to them without commercial profit-making activity is not a security agency; a bona fide interpretative belief and absence of suppression preclude invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Issue (i): Whether a municipal corporation was liable to service tax on advertisement tax or licence fee collected for permitting display of advertisements before 1 July 2012.

Analysis: During the relevant period, the taxable entry for selling of space for advertisement required a service to be provided by a person. A sovereign local body was not covered by the term "person" before that expression was defined under the service-tax law. Further, the amount collected under the municipal law for display of advertisements was advertisement tax, a statutory levy authorised by Article 243X of the Constitution of India, and not consideration for a taxable service.

Conclusion: The municipal corporation was not liable to service tax on the advertisement tax or licence fee collected during the relevant period, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the demand.

Analysis: The dispute concerned interpretation of the charging provisions, and no suppression with intent to evade tax could be attributed to a government local body. The adopted ruling held that the extended limitation period was therefore unavailable.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period of limitation was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand was unsustainable; consequently, no interest or penalties could survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Before the relevant statutory definition of "person" took effect, a sovereign municipal corporation collecting advertisement tax as a statutory levy was not providing a taxable service, and extended limitation cannot rest on alleged suppression in such an interpretative dispute.

Issues: Whether collection of adda-fee by a management contractor operating and maintaining State-regulated bus terminals under a concession agreement constitutes taxable Support Services of Business or Commerce.

Analysis: Service tax is a contract-based levy, requiring examination of the contractual nexus between the service provider and the recipient. The concession arrangement was between the appellant and the State Government/PUNBUS; no contract existed between the appellant and individual bus operators. The bus terminals were public-utility infrastructure developed and operated under State regulation, and the appellant's collection of adda-fee was authorised under the concession arrangement in consideration of its investment, rather than consideration for support provided to bus operators. The applicable precedent had determined that such collection, absent a direct contractual relationship with bus operators, is not Business Support Service.

Conclusion: Collection of adda-fee under the State concession arrangement did not constitute Support Services of Business or Commerce; service tax was not payable by the appellant.

Issues: Whether the notional cost of buyer-supplied drawings and designs, and royalty paid by the buyer to its foreign collaborator, is includible in the assessable value of automobile components under Rule 6 of the Central Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000.

Analysis: Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944 permits adoption of transaction value where the buyer and manufacturer are unrelated and price is the sole consideration. Rule 6 permits addition only of the money value of additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer to the manufacturer. Buyer-supplied drawings or designs are includible only where they are used in, or necessary for, production and relieve the manufacturer of an expense otherwise required to be incurred by it.

Analysis: The drawings supplied at the vendor-selection stage were only specifications enabling prospective vendors to understand requirements and quote prices. They were not detailed manufacturing drawings used for production; the manufacturer remained responsible for preparing the detailed designs required for manufacture. No consideration in addition to the agreed price flowed from the buyer after selection of the manufacturer. The buyer's royalty payment to its foreign collaborator was not consideration flowing to the manufacturer and had no nexus with the manufacture or clearance of the components.

Conclusion: The notional value of the drawings and designs and the buyer's royalty payment are not includible in the assessable value; the demand, interest and penalty based on such inclusion cannot be sustained.

Issues: (i) Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset; (ii) Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased; (iii) Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Issue (i): Whether the land sold was agricultural land excluded from the definition of capital asset.

Analysis: The registered sale deed described the land as industrial-purpose land, the revenue record showed it as uncultivated, and the purchaser acquired it for non-agricultural use. The assessee had also returned the gain from its sale as capital gain. Applying the test concerning the actual and intended use of land, these circumstances established that its character at the time of sale was non-agricultural.

Conclusion: The land was a capital asset and not agricultural land; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether deduction under Section 54B was available for investment in the land purchased.

Analysis: The purchased land was classified in the registered purchase deed as industrial-purpose land. Further, the sold land had not been used for agricultural purposes during the prescribed preceding period, as reflected by the revenue record and its established industrial character. The statutory conditions for the deduction were therefore not met.

Conclusion: Deduction under Section 54B was not allowable; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the validity of the revision order could be challenged in proceedings arising from the consequential assessment.

Analysis: The revision order had not been independently challenged. The appeal arose from the appellate order concerning the consequential assessment, and did not permit a challenge to the unappealed revision order.

Conclusion: The challenge to the revision order was barred in these proceedings; this issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessment treating the transferred land as a taxable capital asset and denying the claimed agricultural-land reinvestment relief remains sustained, and the unchallenged revision order cannot be assailed collaterally.

Ratio Decidendi: Land is not excluded as agricultural land where the cumulative evidence of its recorded status, contractual description, use and intended non-agricultural exploitation establishes its non-agricultural character; deduction for reinvestment in agricultural land requires satisfaction of the prescribed agricultural-use conditions.