Limitation and condonation rules cannot be extended beyond the statutory outer limit; a wrong provision cited does not invalidate a sustainable order.

Where a statute prescribes both a limitation period and an outer limit for condonation, the authority has no jurisdiction to extend time beyond that fixed maximum, and statutory text must be applied as enacted. The article explains that the appellate authority therefore could not entertain a delayed appeal beyond the prescribed limit, and refusal to condone delay was legally correct. It also states that an order is not vitiated merely because it cites the wrong statutory provision, so long as the power exists in law and the decision is otherwise sustainable. On that basis, the challenge to the refusal to entertain the delayed appeal failed.

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Issues: (i) Whether the appellate authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed by the amended Customs Act; (ii) whether reference to a wrong statutory provision vitiated the impugned order.

Issue (i): Whether the appellate authority could condone delay beyond the maximum period prescribed by the amended Customs Act.

Analysis: Where a statute prescribes not only a limitation period but also the maximum period upto which delay may be condoned, the authority cannot extend that limit. A statutory provision must receive strict adherence and cannot be rewritten by adding to or subtracting from its text. The analogy drawn from Section 148 and Order VIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure illustrates that where the legislature has fixed an outer limit, no further extension is permissible beyond that limit.

Conclusion: The appellate authority had no power to condone delay beyond the prescribed limit, and the rejection of the delayed appeal was correct.

Issue (ii): Whether reference to a wrong statutory provision vitiated the impugned order.

Analysis: An order is not invalid merely because it mentions an incorrect provision, so long as the power exercised is otherwise available in law and the decision is supportable on the correct legal basis. The mistaken reference to the Central Excise Act, 1944 instead of the Customs Act did not affect the legality of the order.

Conclusion: The wrong statutory reference did not vitiate the impugned order.

Final Conclusion: The challenge to the refusal to entertain the delayed appeal failed, and the writ petition was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: When a statute fixes both the limitation period and the outer limit for condonation, the authority has no jurisdiction to extend it further, and an incorrect statutory reference does not invalidate an otherwise sustainable order.

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