Documentary proof under the Evidence Act does not equate to proving contents without the writer, though binding precedent controlled the result.

Proof of a document's execution or handwriting does not by itself make its contents admissible without the writer or signatory being called, because documentary proof under the Evidence Act is distinct from proving the truth or probative value of those contents. The Court stated that contents may be proved only through primary or secondary evidence and that the oral-evidence rule should not be imported into documentary evidence. However, it declined to depart from binding Division Bench precedent in the matter before it, and the postcard was not admitted in evidence.

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Issues: Whether a document, once its execution or handwriting is proved, is admissible in evidence to prove its contents without calling the writer or signatory as a witness.

Analysis: The Court held that the admissibility of documentary evidence is governed by the Evidence Act, under which the contents of documents may be proved by primary or secondary evidence and documentary proof is distinct from the separate question of the truth or probative value of those contents. It observed that requiring the writer to be called in every case would wrongly import the rule applicable to oral evidence into documentary evidence and would conflict with the statutory scheme governing proof of documents. However, bound by the contrary Division Bench view, the Court declined to depart from that precedent in deciding the application before it.

Conclusion: The postcard was not admitted in evidence.

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