Void later lease cannot impliedly surrender prior tenancy; fire damage also did not end possession rights.

A void later lease cannot operate as an implied surrender of an earlier valid lease, because surrender by operation of law requires a valid and effective subsequent tenancy. The earlier lease therefore remained subsisting where the permanent lease was void under the governing religious endowments law. Destruction of the leased house by fire did not automatically determine the sub-lease; the statutory option to treat the lease as void had to be clearly exercised and possession yielded up. Mere permission from the head lessor to erect a hut was not an unambiguous surrender. The plaintiff remained entitled to recover possession.

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Issues: (i) Whether the plaintiff's earlier valid lease from the head lessor stood determined by reason of the plaintiff taking a permanent lease that was void under the governing religious endowments law; (ii) Whether the destruction of the leased house by fire or the defendant's conduct in obtaining permission from the head lessor terminated the sub-lease or defeated the plaintiff's right to recover possession.

Issue (i): Whether the plaintiff's earlier valid lease from the head lessor stood determined by reason of the plaintiff taking a permanent lease that was void under the governing religious endowments law.

Analysis: A surrender by operation of law can arise only when the later lease is valid and capable of taking effect. Where the later transaction is void ab initio, it cannot be treated as an effective new lease so as to work an implied surrender of the earlier lease. The voidness of the permanent lease meant that no legal surrender or extinguishment of the prior subsisting lease could be inferred.

Conclusion: The earlier lease did not stand determined, and the plaintiff's title under that lease remained unaffected.

Issue (ii): Whether the destruction of the leased house by fire or the defendant's conduct in obtaining permission from the head lessor terminated the sub-lease or defeated the plaintiff's right to recover possession.

Analysis: Destruction of a substantial part of the subject matter does not automatically determine a lease; the lessee has only an option to treat it as void under the statutory provision governing such cases. That option must be clearly and directly exercised, and possession must also be yielded up. Mere procurement of permission from the head lessor to erect a hut was not an unambiguous determination of the sub-lease and did not amount to surrender of possession. The defendant, having remained in possession, could not deny the plaintiff's right to recover it.

Conclusion: The sub-lease was not effectively terminated by fire or by the defendant's conduct, and the plaintiff was entitled to possession.

Final Conclusion: The courts below erred in refusing relief. The decree against the plaintiff was set aside and the second appeal succeeded, leaving the plaintiff entitled to recover possession.

Ratio Decidendi: A void later lease cannot work an implied surrender of an earlier valid lease, and a lease is not automatically determined by destruction of the property unless the lessee clearly exercises the statutory option to treat it as void and yields up possession.

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