Limitation period for statutory appeals: specific time barred appeal; 112-day unexplained delay after COVID exclusions not condoned, appeal upheld.

Whether an NCLT appeal against a liquidator's rejection is maintainable despite delay was decided by applying the specific statutory appeal period for liquidation decisions and the Limitation Act's proviso permitting explanation of delay in the petition; the appellate body's general power to admit appeals cannot displace a specific statutory time bar. The appellant admitted 830 days' delay, claimed COVID 19 period exclusions totalling 718 days, leaving 112 unexplained days; the pleadings did not adequately justify that residual delay, so condonation was refused and the dismissal on limitation grounds was upheld.

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Issues: Whether the appeal filed before the NCLT against the liquidator's rejection of claim is barred by limitation and whether the delay of 112 days (after accounting for COVID-19 exclusion) is liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The applicable statutory framework comprises the specific appeal period prescribed for appeals against a liquidator's decision under Section 42 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the general powers in Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and the proviso permitting explanation of delay in the body of the petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The appeal was filed substantially beyond the prescribed period for a statutory appeal; the appellant admitted a total delay of 830 days and claimed exclusion of 718 days on account of periods excluded by orders of the Supreme Court related to the COVID-19 pandemic, leaving an unexplained delay of 112 days. The attempt to invoke the general power under Section 60(5) to overcome the specific limitation period is not available to override the statutory time bar established by the specific appeal provision. The explanation offered in the pleadings (paras 2 and 15) does not adequately account for or justify the remaining delay of 112 days required for condonation under the Limitation Act.

Conclusion: The appeal is barred by limitation and the remaining delay after COVID-19 exclusions is not satisfactorily explained; the application for condonation of the delay is refused and the impugned order dismissing the appeal on limitation grounds is upheld.

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