Statutory property rights cannot be curtailed by executive order, and an illegal assignment condition may be severed if the grant remains workable.

Kumki privileges attached to land, though described as privileges, were recognised and regulated by statutory forest rules and Standing Orders, so they constituted property rights that could be curtailed only by law and not by a mere executive instruction; the executive order reducing timber entitlement was therefore invalid. The condition relating to trees in the assignment order was also held severable, because it was not integral to the land assignment and could be excised without affecting the valid grant. On that basis, the unlawful condition was removed while the assignment itself remained effective, and the High Court's relief was sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the kumki privileges attached to the land were property rights capable of protection under the Constitution and could be curtailed only by law and not by an executive order. (ii) Whether the invalid condition relating to trees in the assignment order was severable from the rest of the assignment, so that only the condition could be quashed while the assignment itself was sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the kumki privileges attached to the land were property rights capable of protection under the Constitution and could be curtailed only by law and not by an executive order.

Analysis: The kumki rights, though described as privileges, were recognised by the statutory forest rules and the Board's Standing Orders. Their scope was regulated by law, but their existence as rights was not denied. Because the rights were protected by statutory rules, they could be abridged, curtailed, or taken away only by law and not by a mere executive instruction. The Government's order reducing the timber entitlement was purely executive and not a law.

Conclusion: The kumki privileges were property rights and the executive condition restricting them was invalid.

Issue (ii): Whether the invalid condition relating to trees in the assignment order was severable from the rest of the assignment, so that only the condition could be quashed while the assignment itself was sustained.

Analysis: The legality of the assignment had to be examined by asking whether the valid and invalid portions were severable and whether the remaining part could stand on its own. The condition concerning trees was not integral to the grant of the land itself. Once the competent authority decided to assign the land, the illegal condition could be excised without destroying the valid assignment. The defect did not require the whole order to fall.

Conclusion: The invalid condition was severable and the assignment could stand after its excision.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed. The High Court's grant of relief was sustained, and the assignment remained effective without the unlawful tree-related condition.

Ratio Decidendi: Rights recognised and regulated by statute cannot be curtailed by executive order, and an illegal condition appended to an otherwise valid order may be severed if the valid part is self-contained and operative on its own.

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