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Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the findings of a domestic disciplinary enquiry by reappreciating evidence and by treating the standard of proof and the alleged denial of documents as grounds to set aside the dismissal.
Analysis: Judicial review in disciplinary matters is confined to examining whether the enquiry was fairly held, whether there is some evidence to support the findings, and whether the conclusions are perverse, arbitrary, mala fide, or in breach of natural justice. The High Court cannot sit in appeal over the enquiry officer's assessment of evidence or test the sufficiency or adequacy of that evidence. The proper standard in a departmental proceeding is preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the alleged denial of documents, there was no proof that the claimed request had been received by the bank, and no basis to infer a violation of natural justice. The findings of shortage and misconduct were supported by the enquiry record and could not be displaced on a reassessment of facts.
Conclusion: The High Court's interference was unjustified, and the dismissal from service was restored.
Ratio Decidendi: In disciplinary proceedings, a writ court may interfere only for absence of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness, mala fides, or breach of natural justice, and not by reweighing evidence or substituting its own view on sufficiency of proof.