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Issues: Whether the High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence in a departmental enquiry and setting aside the domestic enquiry findings and dismissal of the bank officer.
Analysis: The Court examined the scope of judicial review under Article 226 in departmental or disciplinary proceedings and reiterated settled principles that courts are not appellate fact-finders in domestic enquiries. Interference is permissible only where findings are based on no evidence, are perverse, there is violation of principles of natural justice, arbitrariness, mala fides or extraneous considerations. The Court noted that the Single Judge and Division Bench substituted their view on adequacy and acceptability of evidence rather than applying the limited test of whether a reasonable tribunal could have reached the inquiry officer's conclusion. The Court further considered the standard of proof in domestic enquiries as preponderance of probabilities and observed that the High Court impermissibly drew inferences in the absence of proof (for example, of a purported letter) and failed to apply the correct burden-shifting principles applicable to administrative decisions.
Conclusion: The High Court's re-appreciation of evidence and reversal of the inquiry findings was unsustainable; the impugned orders are set aside and the appellant's appeal is allowed.
Ratio Decidendi: Courts will not reassess or reappreciate evidence in departmental enquiries and may interfere only if the inquiry findings are based on no evidence, are perverse, or there is breach of natural justice or arbitrariness; the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is preponderance of probabilities.