2014 (12) TMI 1441 - SC - Indian Laws

Scope of judicial review in departmental enquiries reaffirmed: limited re appreciation of evidence and writ petition dismissed

Scope of judicial review in departmental enquiries is limited; courts must not re appreciate evidence as an appellate forum and may interfere only where ... Scope of judicial review in departmental enquiries - Court not to act as an appellate forum in re-appreciation of evidence - Standard of proof in domestic/disciplinary enquiries - preponderance of probabilities - Interference only where findings are based on no evidence or are perverse - Presumption of regularity in administrative orders - Natural justice - burden on challenger to prove denial of documents - HELD THAT:- It is not disputed that the respondent had not at any stage earlier made any grievance that he had written a letter dated 30.12.1987 calling upon the bank to produce certain documents for his perusal and which was denied. It is further not in dispute that there is no record of the bank having received the letter and there is no proof for it. The bank has denied receiving the letter and according to the bank they had received a letter dated 28.12.1987 and they had replied by their letter dated 14.01.1988. In their reply, there was no reference to the letter dated 30.12.1987 because they had not received it. We find that in the absence of proof that any such letter demanding certain documents was received by the bank, it was not permissible for the High Court to proceed to draw an inference that there was a failure of natural justice in the bank having denied certain documents. Thus it may be said, that an administrative authority such as the Appellant, cannot be put to proof of the facts or conditions on which the validity of its order must depend, unless the Respondent can produce evidence which will shift the burden of proof on the shoulders of the Appellant. How much evidence is required for this purpose will always depend on the nature of that particular case. In Potato Marketing Board v. Merricks, it was held that if an order has an apparent fault on the face of it, the burden is easily transferred. However, if the grounds of attack are bad-faith or unreasonableness, the Plaintiff’s task is heavier. The Division Bench merely upheld the findings of the learned Single Judge that there was no clinching evidence in support of the charges. - The justification offered by the Division Bench that the learned Single Judge had to undertake the exercise of analysing the findings of the enquiry officer because the appellants had deprived the respondent of his livelihood is wholly untenable. A transgression of jurisdiction cannot be justified on the ground of consequences, as has been done. Moreover, the reliance by the Division Bench on Mathura Prasad Vs. Union of India & Ors. [2006 (11) TMI 647 - SUPREME COURT] is entirely misplaced, since that case arose in an entirely different set of circumstances. We also find it difficult to understand the justification offered by the Division Bench that there was no failure on the part of the respondent to observe utmost devotion to duty because the case was not one of misappropriation but only of a shortage of money. The Division Bench has itself stated the main reason why its order cannot be upheld in the following words, “on reappreciation of the entire material placed on record, we do not find any reason to interfere with the well considered and merited order passed by the learned Single Judge.” We accordingly set-aside the impugned order and dismiss the writ petition of the respondent. Issues: Whether the High Court erred in re-appreciating evidence in a departmental enquiry and setting aside the domestic enquiry findings and dismissal of the bank officer.Analysis: The Court examined the scope of judicial review under Article 226 in departmental or disciplinary proceedings and reiterated settled principles that courts are not appellate fact-finders in domestic enquiries. Interference is permissible only where findings are based on no evidence, are perverse, there is violation of principles of natural justice, arbitrariness, mala fides or extraneous considerations. The Court noted that the Single Judge and Division Bench substituted their view on adequacy and acceptability of evidence rather than applying the limited test of whether a reasonable tribunal could have reached the inquiry officer's conclusion. The Court further considered the standard of proof in domestic enquiries as preponderance of probabilities and observed that the High Court impermissibly drew inferences in the absence of proof (for example, of a purported letter) and failed to apply the correct burden-shifting principles applicable to administrative decisions.Conclusion: The High Court's re-appreciation of evidence and reversal of the inquiry findings was unsustainable; the impugned orders are set aside and the appellant's appeal is allowed.Ratio Decidendi: Courts will not reassess or reappreciate evidence in departmental enquiries and may interfere only if the inquiry findings are based on no evidence, are perverse, or there is breach of natural justice or arbitrariness; the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings is preponderance of probabilities.