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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with the First Appellate Court's findings of fact; (ii) Whether the sale deed dated 11.7.1983 was liable to be set aside on the ground that the executant was not of sound mind and that fraud had been played on him.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court could interfere in second appeal with the First Appellate Court's findings of fact.
Analysis: A first appeal permits reappraisal of facts, while a second appeal is confined to substantial questions of law. The First Appellate Court had returned a factual finding, based on the medical certificate and surrounding circumstances, that the executant was not of sound mind when the deed was executed. Such a finding of fact could not be disturbed in second appeal in the absence of a legal error.
Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have interfered with the First Appellate Court's factual findings.
Issue (ii): Whether the sale deed dated 11.7.1983 was liable to be set aside on the ground that the executant was not of sound mind and that fraud had been played on him.
Analysis: The sale of one cent for a much higher price, followed within a short interval by the sale of three cents for a grossly inadequate amount, corroborated the conclusion that the executant was not acting in a normal state of mind. The disparity in price, read with the medical evidence and the surrounding circumstances, supported the inference that the transaction was tainted and could not be upheld. The circumstances spoke for themselves and justified interference with the conveyance.
Conclusion: The sale deed dated 11.7.1983 was rightly liable to be set aside.
Final Conclusion: The judgment of the High Court was reversed, the decree of the First Appellate Court was restored, and the impugned sale deed was quashed, leaving the appellants successful in the appeals.
Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, findings of fact of the First Appellate Court cannot be interfered with unless a substantial question of law arises, and a transaction may be invalidated where surrounding circumstances and evidence show that the executant lacked sound mind and the deed was procured through fraud.