1997 (3) TMI 650 - HC - Indian Laws

Post-1956 inherited and willed Hindu property: sons' birthright rejected, treated as absolute; injunction denied, Rs 40 lakh deposit ordered

Property obtained by a male Hindu under a post-1956 devolution and a testamentary bequest was held, prima facie, to be his absolute property vis-à-vis his ... - 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED (i) Whether the suit property, devolving on a son under a testamentary bequest and earlier partition decree, was ancestral/coparcenary property giving the plaintiff an interest by birth, or absolute property of the son. (ii) Whether the act of filing an Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act return describing the holder as 'karta' and the property as 'HUF' amounted to throwing the property into the common hotchpotch (blending) so as to change its character. (iii) Whether absence of prior permission under the lease condition restricting transfer established a present illegality sufficient to justify an interim restraint. (iv) Whether temporary injunction restraining dealings with the suit property should be granted, and if not, on what protective terms. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue (i): Character of the suit property-ancestral/coparcenary vs. absolute ownership Legal framework (as discussed): The Court considered statutory succession principles under the Hindu Succession Act, particularly the effect of succession after 1956, and applied the approach that property devolving on a male heir under the Act is ordinarily taken as his absolute property vis-à-vis his own sons. The Court also treated the interpretation of a Will as governed by the intention expressed in its wording. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court treated certain core facts as undisputed: the predecessor held the leasehold rights; a Will existed; and earlier partition proceedings resulted in division by metes and bounds whereby the father of the plaintiff received the identified share forming the suit property. The Court rejected, at the interim stage, the plaintiff's claim that the father took the property as karta of a coparcenary. It reasoned that, in law, when the father succeeded to the share as successor-in-interest, he was prima facie the absolute owner. Further, because succession occurred after the Hindu Succession Act regime, the Court considered it difficult to treat the devolution as creating HUF property in the heir's hands vis-à-vis his sons. The Court then noted that the present case was additionally governed by a Will; on a careful reading, the Will's intention was that only the three sons would own, share, and possess the property in equal shares 'and none else,' indicating an absolute bequest to them rather than a bequest to their smaller joint families. Conclusion: The Court formed a prima facie conclusion that the suit property in the father's hands was absolute/self-acquired in character for purposes of interim relief and was not ancestral/coparcenary so as to confer an interest by birth on the plaintiff. Issue (ii): Whether the Urban Land Ceiling return changed the property's character (blending into HUF hotchpotch) Legal framework (as discussed): The Court examined the concept of throwing property into the common hotchpotch and required an overt/positive act evidencing relinquishment of exclusive ownership in favour of the HUF. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that, apart from the filing of the return describing the holder as karta and the property as HUF property, there was no other overt act demonstrating an intention to give up absolute rights in favour of the HUF. It reasoned that returns under the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act are filed under a stringent statutory regime with penal consequences for non-filing, and a mere declaration in such a return does not by itself alter the legal character of title. The Court also noted that the competent authority did not accept the HUF characterization and treated the land as belonging to the individual holder. The Court therefore rejected the inference that the return evidenced an intention to blend. Conclusion: Filing the return was held insufficient to prove blending or to transform the suit property from absolute property into HUF property; the father retained absolute ownership for interim purposes. Issue (iii): Effect of alleged lack of permission under lease condition restricting transfer Legal framework (as discussed): The Court addressed the lease condition requiring permission from the competent authority for transfer. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court found that only an agreement to sell had been entered into and that the transfer process was not complete because no sale deed had yet been executed. On that footing, the Court held that, at the present stage, it could not be said that the lease condition had been violated so as to warrant interim restraint. Conclusion: The alleged absence of permission did not establish a current breach sufficient to support an injunction at this stage. Issue (iv): Whether temporary injunction should continue; protective conditions Legal framework (as discussed): The Court applied the settled three prerequisites for interim injunction-prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury-and reiterated that failure of any one is fatal; if injury is compensable in money, injunction should not issue. The Court also accepted that protective monetary measures may be imposed while vacating restraints to safeguard the opposing party's interests pending trial. Interpretation and reasoning: Because the Court reached a prima facie view that the father was absolute owner and could deal with the property (subject to obtaining required permission at the appropriate transfer stage), it found no justification to restrain dealings with the suit property. Considering practical factors noted by the Court (including escalating construction costs and housing needs), it held that continued restraint was unwarranted. However, to protect the plaintiff in the event he ultimately succeeds at trial, the Court accepted the undertaking offered by the purchasers to secure funds in Court. Conclusion: The injunction application was dismissed and the earlier interim restraint was vacated, subject to deposit of Rs. 40 lakhs in Court within six weeks to be kept in fixed deposit initially for three years and paid after disposal of the suit to the successful party with accrued interest; the Court clarified that its views were tentative for deciding interim relief.