Merger of decrees in specific performance matters leaves the appellate decree executable and preserves equitable relief under Section 28.

After an appellate court confirms a decree for specific performance, the trial court decree merges into the appellate decree and only the appellate decree remains executable. In specific performance matters, Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves the court's equitable jurisdiction to extend time or rescind the contract, so non-deposit of the balance consideration within the stipulated period does not automatically make the decree inexecutable. Where the decree holder has substantially performed and later deposits the amount bona fide, execution may still be enforced. A revisional court cannot replace a specific performance decree with a refund order.

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Issues: (i) Whether the decree passed in appeal superseded the trial court decree so that the appellate decree alone governed execution; (ii) Whether, in the facts of the case, the decree for specific performance had become inexecutable for non-deposit of the balance consideration within the stipulated time, or whether relief under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the equities of the case supported execution of the decree.

Issue (i): Whether the decree passed in appeal superseded the trial court decree so that the appellate decree alone governed execution.

Analysis: Once the first appellate court decided the appeals and confirmed the decree for specific performance, the trial court decree merged with the appellate decree. The principle of merger applies when a superior court disposes of the lis, regardless of whether the decree is affirmed, modified, or reversed. There cannot be more than one operative decree governing the same subject matter at the same time, and after the appellate decision it is the appellate decree that becomes executable.

Conclusion: The appellate decree was the operative and executable decree.

Issue (ii): Whether, in the facts of the case, the decree for specific performance had become inexecutable for non-deposit of the balance consideration within the stipulated time, or whether relief under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the equities of the case supported execution of the decree.

Analysis: Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 preserves the court's jurisdiction in specific performance matters and empowers it to extend time or rescind the contract. The decree holder had substantially performed, the remaining consideration was deposited soon after the appellate decree, and the conduct was found bona fide. The absence of a stay under Order 41 Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 did not defeat execution after merger, and the High Court could not in revision substitute the decree for specific performance with a refund order. The equities favoured enforcement rather than forfeiture of the decree.

Conclusion: The decree was not inexecutable, and the objections to execution were rightly rejected.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's order was unsustainable because it exceeded revisional jurisdiction and impermissibly altered the decree for specific performance instead of permitting its execution.

Ratio Decidendi: After an appellate decree is passed, it alone governs execution by virtue of merger; in a decree for specific performance, the court retains equitable power under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to grant time-related relief, and a revisional court cannot convert such a decree into a refund order.

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