2024 (4) TMI 1329 - HC - Indian Laws

Interim relief orders removal of specified posts and making contested videos private for deepfake harm under Intermediary Guidelines

HC granted interim relief to the applicant, directing defendant Nos. 6-13 to remove specified X posts/tweets within seven days under the Intermediary ... Removal of Suit for Damages in addition to Permanent and Mandatory Injunction for directing the defendants for removal of objectionable X posts/Tweets and videos from the social media platforms - Seeking ad interim ex parte injunction to take down the posts/videos - restraint on defendants including their agents, representatives, associates, heirs, relatives etc., to cease and desist from posting any derogatory and harmful material on the social media platforms - HELD THAT:- The 3-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs. Kartick Das [1994 (5) TMI 168 - SUPREME COURT] had observed that an ex parte injunction should be granted only in exceptional circumstances and the factors to be considered are: (i) whether irreparable or serious mischief would ensue to the plaintiff, (ii) whether refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve, (iii) the time at which the plaintiff first noticed the act complained of, (iv) whether the party had acquiesced for some time, (v) whether the applicant/plaintiff has approached in good faith to seek injunction, and (vi) whether such ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time. In the Suits of Defamation against media platforms or Journalists, an additional consideration of balance in the Fundamental Right to Free Speech with the Right to Reputation and Privacy, must be borne in mind. The constitutional mandate of protecting journalistic expression cannot be understated and the Courts must tread cautiously while granting interim injunctions. In the case of Bonnard vs. Perryman, the status of a common law principle for the grant of interim injunctions in defamation Suits, has been stated which has come to the christened as Bonnard standard. The Court of Appeal held that the subject matter of an action for defamation is so special so as to acquire exceptional caution in exercising the jurisdiction to interfere by injunction before the trial of an action to prevent and anticipate wrong. Here is the case where the applicant/plaintiff while being a public figure, had only been discharging his professional duty in appearing in a Court of law to defend a litigant. The manhandling of the applicant/plaintiff and snatching of his Advocate’s band while appearing in the Court is the most condemnable act, as has also been observed by the Apex Court while taking suo motu cognizance of this matter. The Right to Legal Aid for Representation before the Court is again a constitutional right protected under Article 21 and entails a corresponding duty on the legal professionals to discharge their obligations in the most diligent matter, to best of their capabilities - It cannot be denied that the press and the Media had a duty to report this incident for the benefit of the public, but there was also a corresponding duty to remain truthful to the incident. The deepfake videos showing the plaintiff being beaten up and the claims of the applicant/plaintiff having been beaten, are nothing but an over-sensationalization and depiction of facts which are patently false. Prima facie dissemination or playing of such videos has not only caused harm to the reputation of the plaintiff as has been asserted by him, but also has the potential of persistent threat of being aired and used against the plaintiff at any time in future. The balance of convenience also lies in favour of the plaintiff for the simple reason that by making these videos private or injuncting them from being available on the public platforms, would not, in any way, infringe on the rights of the defendants of freedom of speech and expression which they can, in any case, exercise within the defined parameters. However, the inconvenience that would result from these videos and X posts/Tweets etc., continuing to remain in public domain, has the potential to cause an inconvenience which may not be possible to be reparated or compensated by damages or otherwise, in future. It is directed that the X Posts/Tweets (URLs annexed as “Annexure-1”) which have not been removed, be removed within seven days by defendant Nos. 6 to 13 in terms of the Intermediary Guidelines. It is further directed that the videos which are in the public domain be made private by defendant No. 14 and not to be put in the public domain, without the Orders of this Court. Application disposed off. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether ad interim ex parte injunctions should be granted to restrain defendants and intermediary platforms from publishing or hosting specific social-media posts, videos and deepfake content alleged to be defamatory. 2. How to balance the constitutional Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression against the Right to Reputation and Dignity when interlocutory relief is sought in defamation claims involving public figures and mass-published internet content. 3. Whether the Bonnard standard and allied principles (requiring exceptional caution and proof that a defence would undoubtedly fail at trial) apply to pre-trial injunctions in the context of social media, electronic publications and alleged deepfakes. 4. Whether truth/justification, fair comment, or public interest defences preclude interim injunctive relief where defendants assert they merely reported or commented on an incident that occurred. 5. The extent of relief that can be granted against intermediaries/platforms under the Intermediary Guidelines at interlocutory stage (removal/making content private) and the temporal/limited nature of such orders. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Grant of ad interim ex parte injunctions against defendants and platforms for alleged defamatory posts/videos (including deepfakes) Legal framework: The principles governing ex parte interlocutory injunctions in defamation actions require exceptional caution; factors from the Morgan Stanley standard (irreparable injury, balance of convenience, prima facie case, time of notice, acquiescence, good faith, limited duration) are relevant. For defamation specifically, the Bonnard principle mandates restraint unless the alleged libel is shown to be untrue or the defence would inevitably fail at trial. Precedent treatment: The Court followed and applied the Bonnard standard and allied authority (including Fraser, Kartar Singh, and recent appellate guidance stressing restraint in pre-trial censorship), and relied on more recent decisions emphasising that ex parte injunctions should be exceptional and granted only when content is malicious or palpably false. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recognised the plaintiff as a public figure (senior advocate and political spokesperson) and acknowledged the public interest in reporting the incident; however, it identified that certain videos (notably deepfakes and materially false depictions of the applicant being beaten) prima facie went beyond truthful reporting and sensationalised or fabricated facts. The Court weighed the likelihood of irreparable harm to reputation from continued public dissemination of such content against the defendants' speech rights, emphasising that injunctions prevent future harm and need not redress past acts. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - ex parte interim relief in defamation cases involving social media may be granted in exceptional circumstances where the impugned material is prima facie false, malicious or a deepfake and would cause irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated. Obiter - general observations on public figures being 'not too thin-skinned' and the broader role of media in public scrutiny. Conclusions: The Court granted limited interlocutory measures: (a) ordered that certain contested posts (URLs) be removed by specified defendants within seven days under Intermediary Guidelines; (b) directed that specified videos already made private remain inaccessible to the public without court order; and (c) found that some content not contested or already private could be removed by the platforms. The relief was tailored, temporal and confined to materials identified as prima facie harmful. Issue 2 - Balancing Freedom of Speech vs. Right to Reputation and Dignity for public figures on social media Legal framework: Article 19(1)(a) rights must be balanced with Article 21 rights of dignity and reputation; restrictions are permissible under Article 19(2). Courts must apply an exacting threshold before restraining speech, particularly on matters of public interest and when defendants assert justification or fair comment. Precedent treatment: The Court followed authorities stressing greater caution in awarding injunctions where public interest, justification, or fair comment is asserted (Bonnard, Fraser, Kartar Singh, Indu Jain, Pushp Sharma). The judgment also relied on recent pronouncements that ex parte pre-trial injunctions should not be granted unless the content is malicious or palpably false. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court accepted that public figures face closer scrutiny and that reporting and commentary on a courthouse incident are matters of public interest. Nonetheless, it distinguished between legitimate reporting/debate and fabricated or over-sensationalised media (including deepfakes) which prima facie undermine personal dignity and reputation and pose a continuing threat. The Court emphasised the high threshold for public figures to obtain injunctive relief but recognised that dignity and reputation are protectable against demonstrably false or manipulated content. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - public figure status raises the threshold for injunctions, but does not preclude relief where dissemination of false/deepfake content would cause irreparable harm; injunctions must be narrowly tailored to balance competing rights. Obiter - commentary on the role of media and tolerance expected of public office-holders. Conclusions: The Court applied a calibrated test: protect free speech but permit interlocutory restraint on content that is prima facie false or manipulated and likely to cause irreparable reputational harm, while preserving defendants' ability to advance defences at trial. Issue 3 - Application of Bonnard standard and requirement that defendant's defence would 'undoubtedly fail' at trial for ex parte relief Legal framework: The Bonnard principle prescribes exceptional caution in granting pre-trial injunctions in defamation; injunctions should not be granted unless the alleged libel is untrue or the defendant's defence (justification/fair comment) would unquestionably fail at trial. Precedent treatment: The Court followed the Bonnard standard and recent rulings reiterating that pre-trial injunctions can only be issued where the material is malicious or palpably false and the respondent's defence would fail. The Court cited recent authority cautioning against stifling public debate via pre-trial orders. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court assessed whether the defendants' asserted defences (truthful reporting, fair comment, public interest) were tenable. Where defendants merely reported an acknowledged incident, an injunction would generally be inappropriate. Conversely, where deepfakes and patently false depictions existed, the Bonnard caution yielded to the need to prevent irreversible reputational harm. The Court required a prima facie showing that challenged content was not merely adverse comment but materially false or manipulated. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Bonnard standard governs interlocutory relief; a plaintiff must show that the defence would not succeed, or that content is palpably false/malicious (especially deepfakes), to obtain ex parte relief. Obiter - illustrations of when reporting qualifies as fair comment. Conclusions: The Bonnard standard was applied to deny a blanket ex parte injunction but to permit targeted interim measures where the plaintiff demonstrated prima facie falsity/manipulation (deepfakes) and irreparable harm; where defendants' reporting was of an admitted incident, injunctions were refused or limited. Issue 4 - Sufficiency of truth/justification, fair comment, public interest defences to defeat interlocutory relief Legal framework: Truth/justification, fair comment and public interest are established defences in defamation law; truth is a complete defence. Interlocutory assessment requires examination of whether plaintiff has prima facie disproved truth or shown malice/palpable falsity. Precedent treatment: The Court treated existing authorities as precluding interlocutory restraint where defendants plausibly assert truth or fair comment on public matters, unless those defences are demonstrably untenable at threshold. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court recognised that several defendants contended they merely reported an incident that admittedly occurred (manhandling), and thus justification/fair comment could be viable. Where the plaint itself admitted certain facts (e.g., band snatched), reporting on those facts could not be curbed. However, deepfake or materially false representations went beyond mere reportage and were not protected by justification. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - successful assertion of truth/justification or fair comment will normally preclude interim relief; where such defences appear prima facie tenable, injunctions should be declined. Obiter - remarks on quantification of damages not necessarily precluding injunctive relief. Conclusions: The Court refrained from granting injunctive relief against defendants whose postings were grounded in admitted facts and arguable fair comment; it granted relief where content was prima facie fabricated or manipulated and thus not protected by truth/justification. Issue 5 - Interim relief against intermediaries/platforms under Intermediary Guidelines and scope/duration of such orders Legal framework: Intermediary Guidelines permit removal of content on platforms subject to process; courts may direct intermediaries to take down content pending adjudication when criteria are met. Precedent treatment: The Court followed recent jurisprudence requiring that orders against platforms be specific, limited in scope and time, and compliant with intermediary rules rather than blanket or perpetual censorship. Interpretation and reasoning: Considering uncontested posts and prima facie harmful videos, the Court directed specified intermediary defendants to remove listed X posts/Tweets within seven days and ordered that public videos be made private till further order. The directions were tailored to the identified URLs/documents and limited temporally to the pendency of the suit, reflecting caution to avoid undue suppression of lawful speech. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - courts can direct intermediaries to remove or privatise specific content on an interlocutory basis where prima facie harm and non-tenability of defences are shown; such orders must be precise and time-limited. Obiter - observations on platforms' continuing obligations. Conclusions: The Court directed removal of specified posts by intermediaries within a fixed period and restrained making certain videos public without court permission, thereby granting narrowly framed interlocutory relief consistent with intermediary rules and constitutional balance.