2021 (3) TMI 1480 - HC - Indian Laws

Section 9 SH Act three-month limitation expired; resignation didn't extend time; internal inquiry not a fresh cause

Vivek Tyagi, Pulin Kumar, Adidas India Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Haryana and others.

Vivek Tyagi, Pulin Kumar, Adidas India Marketing Pvt. Ltd. Versus State of Haryana and others. - 2021:PHHC:023354 ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether the complaint to the Local Committee was barred by limitation under Section 9 of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013, having regard to the date of the last alleged incident and the statutory extension available to the Internal Complaints Committee/Local Committee. 2. Whether the Local Committee had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint when an Internal Complaints Committee existed at the workplace and whether the complaint ought first to have been filed with the Internal Complaints Committee. 3. Whether, in view of interim proceedings and pleadings already filed before the Local Committee and the stay by the writ court, the appropriate remedy was to remit the matter to the Local Committee or to quash the complaint and the proceedings before it. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Limitation under Section 9 (time-bar): Legal framework Section 9 prescribes that an aggrieved woman must make a complaint in writing to the Internal Complaints Committee or the Local Committee within three months from the date of the incident, or in the case of a series of incidents, within three months from the date of the last incident. The proviso permits the Committee to extend that period by a further period not exceeding three months, for reasons to be recorded in writing. Thus, the maximum permissible period for lodging a complaint under the Act is six months from the date of the incident (or last incident). Issue 1 - Precedent Treatment No earlier judicial precedents were invoked in the judgment to alter or distinguish the statutory limitation regime; the Court applied the plain language of Section 9. Issue 1 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court held that the limitation clock begins to run from the date of the last incident (03.11.2018 in the present facts). The complainant remained employed until 16.01.2019 and resigned that day, but did not lodge any complaint within the initial three-month period, nor within any permissible three-month extension. The Court examined communications concerning full and final settlement dated 12.06.2019 and concluded those communications did not constitute fresh acts of sexual harassment or give rise to a new cause of action that would reset or extend the limitation period under Section 9. The Court further held that alleged ongoing communications with management or an internal inquiry did not, as a matter of law, operate to extend statutory limitation absent pleading or material showing that the circumstances prevented filing within the prescribed period and that the Committee had recorded reasons to extend. Issue 1 - Ratio vs. Obiter Ratio: The clear statutory scheme of Section 9 fixes a maximum limitation of six months from the date of the incident (or last incident) for complaints under the Act, and communications concerning full and final settlement or internal inquiries do not automatically amount to fresh causes of action or justify extension unless they are themselves acts of sexual harassment or the Committee, for reasons to be recorded, extends the period within the statutory limit. Obiter: Observations that mere ongoing contact with management or internal inquiries, without more, will not extend limitation are explanatory but flow directly from the statutory text. Issue 1 - Conclusion The complaint was time-barred. The last alleged incident (03.11.2018) placed the maximum lodging period at six months; no valid complaint was filed within that period and the communications relied on by the complainant did not constitute fresh acts restarting limitation or justify extension under Section 9. Issue 2 - Jurisdiction of Local Committee vs. Internal Complaints Committee: Legal framework Section 4 requires every employer to constitute an Internal Complaints Committee (ICC). Section 6 mandates constitution of a Local Committee to receive complaints from establishments where an ICC has not been constituted because the establishment has less than ten workers or where the complaint is against the employer. Section 9 directs that complaints be made to the ICC if constituted, or to the Local Committee if the ICC is not so constituted. Issue 2 - Precedent Treatment No authority was cited that altered the statutory allocation of jurisdiction between ICC and Local Committee; the Court relied on the statutory division of forums. Issue 2 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court construed Section 6 and Section 9 disjunctively: the Local Committee's jurisdiction is limited to circumstances where (a) an ICC has not been constituted (e.g., establishments with fewer than ten workers), or (b) the complaint is against the employer himself. The Court noted that where an ICC exists, ordinarily the ICC is the proper forum to receive complaints; however, having found the complaint time-barred on limitation grounds, the Court declined to decide the second issue (whether the complaint should have been first filed with the ICC) on the merits. Issue 2 - Ratio vs. Obiter Obiter/Ratione decidendi limited: The Court reiterated the statutory allocation of jurisdiction but did not make a definitive ruling on the particular fact whether the Local Committee erred in entertaining the complaint where an ICC existed because the decision to quash was predicated on limitation. The statutory interpretation that the Local Committee is an alternative forum only in specified circumstances is a binding part of the reasoning. Issue 2 - Conclusion The Court noted that ordinarily complaints should be taken to the ICC if one exists; however, it did not decide whether the Local Committee lacked jurisdiction in the instant case because the limitation ruling rendered further enquiry unnecessary. Issue 3 - Remedy and exercise of writ jurisdiction: Legal framework Writ jurisdiction permits quashing proceedings that are without jurisdiction or barred by law. Equitable considerations and the stage of proceedings may inform whether matter should be remitted to the competent forum or quashed. Issue 3 - Precedent Treatment No precedents were invoked to require remittal in this factual posture; the Court exercised discretion based on the record before it. Issue 3 - Interpretation and reasoning The Court observed that further proceedings before the Local Committee had been stayed while the writ petitions were pending and detailed pleadings had been filed by the parties in the writ proceedings. Given the stay, the stage of adjudication, and the clear limitation defect, the Court found it inappropriate to remit the matter back to the Local Committee for fresh adjudication. The Court therefore proceeded to decide the limitation issue and, on that basis, quashed the complaint and the proceedings before the Local Committee. Issue 3 - Ratio vs. Obiter Ratio: Where a forum has acted without jurisdiction because a complaint is time-barred under the Act, and where writ proceedings have reached a substantive stage with stays and pleadings, the writ court may quash the complaint and proceedings rather than remit, particularly where remittal would be futile given the limitation bar. Issue 3 - Conclusion The writ petitions were allowed; the complaint and the proceedings before the Local Committee were quashed. Costs were not imposed. Cross-references See Issue 1 for the primary statutory limitation analysis that determined the outcome and rendered further consideration of Issue 2 unnecessary on the facts of the case.