Custodia legis ends with disposal of the main appeal, limiting later jurisdiction and enforcing only surviving lease terms.

Once the underlying probate appeal and connected applications were finally disposed of, the property ceased to remain in custodia legis and the court could not continue to exercise jurisdiction over it through a later application. The dismissal of special leave petitions did not amount to affirmation of the earlier reasoning or create merger for that purpose. On the lease dispute, the court treated the 5 May 1986 order as permission to the joint receivers to enter into a lease on stated terms, not as a completed grant of lease in the abstract. Equity supported enforcement of the agreed lease terms only for the premises already delivered and occupied, with arrears and dues payable, while relief for the other premises and damages was not sustained.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to pass directions on the respondent's later application after the main appeal had already been disposed of and the receivership had come to an end; (ii) whether the respondent could claim enforcement of the lease arrangement and ancillary relief in respect of both premises, including damages.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court had jurisdiction to pass directions on the respondent's later application after the main appeal had already been disposed of and the receivership had come to an end.

Analysis: The property had been under court supervision only so long as the probate appeal remained pending and the joint receivers continued in office. Once the appeal was compromised and disposed of, all pending applications also stood disposed of and the property ceased to remain in custodia legis. On that footing, the High Court could not treat the later application as one in a live proceeding or assume continuing seisin over the estate merely because of earlier observations made while the special leave petitions were dismissed. The dismissal of the special leave petitions did not operate as an affirmation of the High Court's earlier reasoning or create merger in the sense contended for.

Conclusion: The impugned order of the High Court could not be sustained so far as it proceeded after the appeal had already been concluded and the receivership had ended.

Issue (ii): Whether the respondent could claim enforcement of the lease arrangement and ancillary relief in respect of both premises, including damages.

Analysis: The order of 5 May 1986 was treated as permission to the joint receivers to enter into a lease on stipulated terms, not as a completed judicial grant of lease in the abstract. As regards the premises where possession had already been delivered and the respondent remained in occupation, equity warranted enforcement of the agreed lease terms for the remaining period and payment of arrears and dues. But for the other premises, the respondent had been denied relief earlier, and that position was not reopened. The claim for damages also failed because no sustainable case for specific relief in relation to that premises was established. The statutory background concerning executors, probate and administration pendente lite supported the conclusion that the receivers' authority was co-terminous with the pending litigation, while the claim for monetary relief did not survive on the facts.

Conclusion: Relief was confined to the premises already in the respondent's possession, while no relief was granted for the other premises or for damages.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded substantially, the High Court's impugned order was set aside in material part, and only limited relief was left in place to enforce the lease terms for the premises already delivered to the respondent.

Ratio Decidendi: Once the underlying appeal and connected applications stand finally disposed of, the property is no longer in custodia legis and the court cannot continue to exercise jurisdiction over it, although equity may still justify enforcement of a limited subsisting arrangement already acted upon.

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