Ancestral coparcenary rights by birth governed the property dispute, and a fact-specific precedent could not defeat them.

Ancestral property shown by the partition deed carries coparcenary character, and children born before partition acquire an interest by birth; omission of some coparceners from the deed does not extinguish that right. A precedent relied on below was distinguishable on its facts and could not be treated as defeating the birthright in the present setting. The challenge to the second defendant's claim to a share depended on unresolved factual questions about marriage and on additional documents produced in appeal, so that aspect required fresh examination by the lower appellate court. The decree was set aside and the matter remitted for limited fresh disposal, while the appellants succeeded on the principal property issue.

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Issues: (i) Whether the suit properties were ancestral coparcenary properties in which the children born before the partition acquired a right by birth, and whether the earlier precedent relied on by the courts below applied to the facts of the case; (ii) whether the findings rejecting the second defendant's claim to a share were liable to be disturbed at this stage.

Issue (i): Whether the suit properties were ancestral coparcenary properties in which the children born before the partition acquired a right by birth, and whether the earlier precedent relied on by the courts below applied to the facts of the case.

Analysis: The recitals in the partition deed showed that the properties were ancestral in character. A Hindu coparcener acquires an interest by birth in ancestral property, and the mere omission of some coparceners from a partition deed does not alter the character of the property or extinguish their birthright. The precedent invoked by the courts below was held to be distinguishable because it did not involve the same factual setting, especially where the children asserting the right had been born before the partition. The state law abolishing the joint family system was also noted as relevant to the time-line of rights, but it did not defeat the existing birthright in the facts proved here.

Conclusion: The finding that the children born before the partition had no right by birth was unsustainable, and the precedent applied by the courts below was inapplicable; this issue was decided in favour of the appellants.

Issue (ii): Whether the findings rejecting the second defendant's claim to a share were liable to be disturbed at this stage.

Analysis: The challenge to the second defendant's marital status turned on factual questions regarding the date and validity of the marriage, which were not fully and properly investigated. The court also noticed that additional documents produced in appeal required consideration, including the question of their admissibility and proof. Since the appeal court had not addressed these matters adequately, a fresh examination by the lower appellate court was necessary.

Conclusion: The findings on this aspect were not finally affirmed and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration.

Final Conclusion: The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court were set aside and the matter was sent back for limited fresh disposal, while the appellants succeeded on the principal questions concerning the character of the property and the applicability of the precedent.

Ratio Decidendi: Where ancestral property is shown by the documents and the asserting coparceners were born before the partition, they acquire a right by birth, and a precedent based on materially different facts cannot be applied as a universal rule to defeat that right.

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