Delegated legislation cannot impose a limitation period defeating a substantive right unless the parent Act clearly authorises it.

A delegated rule made under a general procedural power cannot impose a limitation period for presenting an application under Section 8 before the Forest Tribunal where the parent Act does not expressly authorise that restriction. Such a time-limit affects the substantive right to seek adjudication of title to immovable property and is not a mere procedural regulation. The invalid limitation clause in Rule 3 was treated as ultra vires, while the remaining part of the rule was severed and allowed to operate. The time-bar objection failed, and the application was restored for decision on evidence and merits before the Tribunal.

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Issues: (i) whether the Government had power under the Act to prescribe by rule a limitation period for filing an application under Section 8 before the Forest Tribunal; (ii) whether the offending portion of Rule 3 could be severed and the applications restored for decision on merits.

Issue (i): whether the Government had power under the Act to prescribe by rule a limitation period for filing an application under Section 8 before the Forest Tribunal.

Analysis: The rule-making power under the Act authorised prescription of procedure for the Tribunal after an application was instituted, but did not confer power to create a time-limit for presenting the application itself. A limitation provision of that nature affected the claimant's substantive right to seek adjudication of title to immovable property and could not be treated as a mere matter of procedure. The absence of any express legislative provision authorising such limitation, coupled with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Forest Tribunal and the bar on civil court jurisdiction, showed that the restriction could not be introduced by delegated legislation.

Conclusion: The limitation clause in Rule 3 was ultra vires and void, and the Government had no authority to prescribe that 60-day period for filing the Section 8 application.

Issue (ii): whether the offending portion of Rule 3 could be severed and the applications restored for decision on merits.

Analysis: Since only the time-limit portion of Rule 3 was invalid, the remainder of the rule could operate after omitting the offending words. On that basis, the application could not be rejected as time-barred, and the decision refusing to entertain the delay petition became unnecessary. The proper course was to treat the application as maintainable and remit it for adjudication on evidence and merits.

Conclusion: The offending part of Rule 3 was severed, the dismissal on limitation was set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Forest Tribunal for decision on merits.

Final Conclusion: The appeals succeeded, the time-bar objection failed, and the original application was revived for fresh adjudication before the Tribunal.

Ratio Decidendi: A delegated rule framed under a general power to prescribe procedure cannot validly impose a limitation period that extinguishes or defeats a substantive right to seek adjudication, unless the parent statute clearly authorises such restriction.

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