1980 (10) TMI 214 - HC - Indian Laws

Judicial Review Strikes Down Restrictive 60-Day Limit on Forest Rights Applications Under Section 8

Jayadevan Thampan Versus State of Kerala and Ors.

The SC invalidated Rule 3 of the Kerala Private Forests (Tribunal) Rules, 1972, which imposed a 60-day limitation period for filing applications under ... - 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe core legal questions considered by the Court were:Whether Rule 3 of the Kerala Private Forests (Tribunal) Rules, 1972, as amended, which prescribes a sixty-day time-limit for filing an application under Section 8 of the Kerala Private Forests Vesting and Assignment Act, 1971 (hereinafter 'the Act'), is intra vires or ultra vires the powers conferred on the Government under the Act.Whether the fixation of a period of limitation for filing applications under Section 8 of the Act constitutes a procedural rule within the scope of the rule-making power or affects substantive rights, thereby exceeding delegated legislative authority.Whether the Forest Tribunal was justified in dismissing the application on the ground of delay, given the amended Rule 3 removing the power to condone delay.The extent to which the Government may prescribe procedural rules under Sections 7(5) and 17 of the Act, particularly regarding limitation periods for initiating proceedings before the Tribunal.Whether the impugned rule conflicts with the statutory scheme and principles established by precedent concerning the distinction between substantive and procedural law, especially in relation to limitation periods.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISIssue 1: Validity of Rule 3 of the Kerala Private Forests (Tribunal) Rules, 1972, prescribing a 60-day limitation period for filing applications under Section 8 of the ActRelevant legal framework and precedents: Section 7(5) of the Act empowers the Tribunal to follow such procedure as may be prescribed. Section 17 authorizes the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, including matters expressly required or allowed by the Act. Rule 3 originally allowed condonation of delay for filing applications under Section 8, but was amended in 1977 to remove this proviso and substitute an explanation fixing the limitation period as sixty days from the date of publication of the notification demarcating boundaries under Rule 2A.The Court examined the Supreme Court decision in Bharat Barrel and Iron Manufacturing Co. v. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, where a similar question arose about the validity of rules prescribing limitation periods under delegated powers. The Supreme Court held that limitation periods may affect substantive rights and that delegated powers to prescribe procedure do not extend to fixing limitation periods unless clearly authorized by the legislature.Similarly, in Sales Tax Officer, Ponkunnam v. K.I. Abraham, the Supreme Court held that the phrase 'in the prescribed manner' in a statute does not authorize the rule-making authority to prescribe a time-limit for filing declarations, as the time element is substantive and not procedural.In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shree Padmanabhaswamy Temple Trust, the Kerala High Court held that time elements incorporated in rules prescribing the manner of giving notices under the Income Tax Act were ultra vires, relying on the principle that time limits affecting substantive rights cannot be imposed by delegated legislation unless clearly authorized.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that the power to prescribe procedure under Section 7(5) relates only to the procedure to be followed by the Tribunal after an application has been instituted before it. The filing of the application itself is outside the scope of procedural rules and involves the substantive right of the applicant to seek adjudication of title to immovable property.The Court reasoned that fixing a time-limit for filing applications under Section 8 effectively extinguishes the right to claim title to the land if the application is not filed within the prescribed period. This is a substantive right, not merely a procedural remedy. The Court emphasized that the legislature did not expressly confer power on the Government to prescribe such a limitation period, and the rule-making power under Section 17 cannot be extended to curtail substantive rights.Applying the principle from Bharat Barrel and other precedents, the Court found that the amended Rule 3, which removed the power to condone delay and imposed a strict 60-day limit, was ultra vires and void. The explanation to Rule 3, linking the limitation period to the date of publication of the notification under Rule 2A, was also redundant and invalid.The Court further noted that under ordinary law, title to immovable property can be lost by adverse possession after 12 years (Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963), but the impugned Rule 3 imposed a much shorter period, thereby prematurely extinguishing the right to claim title before the Tribunal.Key evidence and findings: The notification under Rule 2A(2) was published on 8th July 1977, and the application was filed on 7th May 1979, beyond the 60-day period prescribed by the amended Rule 3. The Forest Tribunal dismissed the application and the petition to condone delay based on this limitation.Application of law to facts: Since Rule 3 was held ultra vires, the limitation period imposed by it was invalid. Therefore, the application filed beyond 60 days could not be rejected on the ground of delay. The Tribunal's dismissal of the application and the petition to condone delay was erroneous.Treatment of competing arguments: The Respondents contended that the limitation period was a procedural matter within the scope of Section 7(5) and Section 17, and thus valid. The Court rejected this, holding that limitation periods affect substantive rights and cannot be imposed by delegated rule-making unless expressly authorized.Conclusions: Rule 3, insofar as it prescribes a 60-day limitation period for filing applications under Section 8, is ultra vires and void. The application filed beyond this period is not barred by limitation and must be considered on merits.Issue 2: Scope of the rule-making power under Sections 7(5) and 17 of the ActRelevant legal framework and precedents: Section 7(5) empowers the Tribunal to follow prescribed procedure. Section 17 empowers the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, including matters expressly required or allowed by the Act.Precedents such as Bharat Barrel and Sales Tax Officer v. Abraham emphasize that limitation periods affecting substantive rights cannot be prescribed by delegated legislation under procedural rule-making powers.Court's interpretation and reasoning: The Court clarified that procedural rules relate to the conduct of proceedings before the Tribunal once it is seized of the matter. The filing of the application itself is a substantive step invoking the Tribunal's jurisdiction. Thus, the Government's power to make rules does not extend to prescribing limitation periods for filing applications under Section 8.The Court emphasized that the legislature's omission to prescribe a limitation period in the Act indicates an intention not to fetter the substantive right to apply to the Tribunal. The Government cannot, by rule, impose a limitation period that extinguishes this right.Application of law to facts: The amended Rule 3 exceeded the scope of the Government's delegated powers and was therefore ultra vires.Conclusions: The rule-making power under Sections 7(5) and 17 does not authorize the Government to fix a limitation period for filing applications under Section 8 of the Act.Issue 3: Effect of the invalidity of the limitation period on the Forest Tribunal's decisionsCourt's reasoning: Since Rule 3's limitation period is invalid, the Tribunal erred in dismissing the application and the petition to condone delay. The application should not have been rejected on limitation grounds.The Court invoked the principle of severability, referring to the Supreme Court's decision in State of Kerala v. V.M. Peier, holding that offending words in a provision can be severed to preserve the remainder. Accordingly, the Court read Rule 3 omitting the words prescribing the 60-day limitation and the explanation.Conclusions: The application filed under Section 8 is not barred by limitation and must be considered on merits by the Forest Tribunal. The orders dismissing the application and condonation petition are set aside, and the matter is remitted for fresh consideration.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS'Clause (5) of Section 7 of the Act which provides that 'the Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed' relates to the procedure of the Tribunal after an application under Section 8 is instituted before it and it does not relate to any time-limit for the presentation of the application itself.''Section 17 of the Act which empowers the Government by notification in the Gazette to make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act, also does not empower the delegated authority to prescribe a time-limit for the presentation of applications under Section 8 before the Forest Tribunal.''The fixation of a time-limit for an application under Section 8 of the Act is not merely a procedural matter but affects substantive rights, namely the right to claim title to immovable property.''Rule 3 of the Kerala Private Forests (Tribunal) Rules, 1972, insofar as it prescribes that an application under Section 8 shall be presented within 60 days from the date on which the act which gives rise to the dispute was done, is ultra vires, void and beyond the powers of the Government.''The words 'and shall be presented to the Tribunal within 60 days from the date on which the act which gives rise to the dispute was done' and the explanation to Rule 3 are severed and omitted.''The application under Section 8 filed beyond the prescribed 60 days is not barred by limitation and must be considered on merits.''The Forest Tribunal erred in dismissing the application and the petition to condone delay on the ground of limitation.''The parties are entitled to have their claims adjudicated by the Forest Tribunal on merits, and the matter is remitted accordingly.'