2017 (3) TMI 1967 - HC - Indian Laws

Compensation orders under Section 357(3) CrPC with default imprisonment are appealable as sentence of fine

P.S. Mitra @ Partha Sarathi Mitra Versus Manor Travels Private Limited And Another

P.S. Mitra @ Partha Sarathi Mitra Versus Manor Travels Private Limited And Another - TMI The core legal question considered is whether a judgment and order of conviction imposing imprisonment till the rising of the Court, coupled with an order of compensation under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) and a direction to undergo imprisonment in default of payment of such compensation, is appealable.Another closely related issue is the interpretation of the legal framework governing compensation awarded under Section 357 Cr.P.C., its recovery as a fine under Section 431 Cr.P.C., and the applicability of Section 64 of the Indian Penal Code (I.P.C.) which authorizes imprisonment in default of payment of fine, and whether such imprisonment direction renders the compensation order appealable under Sections 374 and 376 Cr.P.C.The judgment also addresses the competing interpretations of the right of appeal against such compensation orders, especially vis-`a-vis the proviso to Section 376 Cr.P.C. which excludes appeals in petty cases and specifically excludes appealability merely on the ground of imprisonment in default of payment of fine.Further, the judgment examines the precedents and statutory provisions concerning the nature of imprisonment in default of payment of fine or compensation, the distinction between substantive sentence and penalty, and the constitutional implications of the procedure depriving liberty.Finally, the judgment considers the legal fiction created by judicial interpretation equating compensation with fine for the purpose of Section 64 I.P.C. and the consequent necessity to extend appellate remedy provisions to such compensation orders to avoid unfairness and constitutional infirmity.Issue-wise detailed analysis:1. Appealability of order of conviction with compensation and imprisonment in default of payment of compensation:The relevant legal framework includes Sections 357, 372, 374, and 376 of the Cr.P.C., and Section 64 of the I.P.C. Section 357(3) empowers courts to order compensation to victims when imposing a sentence not including fine. Section 431 Cr.P.C. allows recovery of such compensation as if it were a fine. Section 64 I.P.C. authorizes imprisonment in default of payment of fine.Section 374 Cr.P.C. provides the right of appeal against convictions and sentences, while Section 376 Cr.P.C. carves out exceptions, barring appeals in petty cases and specifically stating that a sentence of fine not exceeding certain limits shall not become appealable merely because imprisonment in default of payment of fine is included.The Court noted that compensation per se is not appealable by the convict unless it forms part of a fine under Section 357(1). However, inadequacy of compensation is appealable by the victim under the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C.Precedent cases such as Vijayan v. Sadanandan K. and R. Mohan v. A.K. Vijaya Kumar have held that compensation may be treated as a fine for the purpose of Section 64 I.P.C., permitting imprisonment in default of payment of compensation. This interpretation creates a legal fiction treating compensation as fine to enable recovery mechanisms including imprisonment.However, the proviso to Section 376 Cr.P.C. excludes appealability of sentences of fine not exceeding prescribed limits even if imprisonment in default is ordered. The Court distinguished between a substantive sentence and a penalty imposed for non-payment of fine or compensation, relying on Shantilal v. State of M.P., which held that imprisonment in default of payment of fine is not a sentence but a penalty incurred due to non-payment.The petitioner relied on a precedent which supported appealability of such orders, but the opposing party argued that right of appeal is statutory and cannot be inferred unless expressly provided, relying on various Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the statutory nature of appellate rights.The Court acknowledged the statutory scheme and the proviso to Section 376 Cr.P.C., but also considered the constitutional dimension arising from the deprivation of liberty through imprisonment in default of payment of compensation.2. Constitutional and purposive interpretation of compensation as fine and appellate remedy:The Court emphasized that the legal fiction equating compensation with fine for the purpose of Section 64 I.P.C. enables imprisonment in default of payment of compensation. Since imprisonment deprives liberty, the procedure must be just, reasonable, and fair under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.The Court reasoned that if compensation is treated as fine to impose imprisonment, the appellate remedy available against a sentence of fine under Sections 374 and 376 Cr.P.C. must also extend to such compensation orders. Otherwise, it would lead to an inequitable and unfair situation where the Court can impose imprisonment for non-payment of compensation but the accused cannot appeal against such compensation order.The Court held that denying appealability in such cases would be unjust and unconstitutional, as it would deprive the accused of a statutory remedy against an order that could result in deprivation of liberty.3. Treatment of competing arguments:The Court considered the argument that imprisonment in default of payment of compensation is not a substantive sentence and thus does not render the order appealable. While acknowledging this distinction, the Court found that the purposive interpretation of the law and constitutional principles require that the appellate remedy be available.The Court rejected the contention that the proviso to Section 376 Cr.P.C. excludes appealability merely because imprisonment in default is included, when compensation is treated as fine under Section 64 I.P.C.The Court also addressed the submission that right of appeal is purely statutory and cannot be inferred, holding that the judicial interpretation creating a legal fiction to treat compensation as fine must also carry with it the appellate remedy to avoid constitutional infirmity.4. Final conclusions:The Court concluded that a compensation order treated as a fine under Section 64 I.P.C., coupled with a direction for imprisonment in default of payment, is appealable under Sections 374 and 376 Cr.P.C. as if it were a sentence of fine.The impugned order denying conversion of revision into appeal was set aside, and the trial Court was directed to convert the revision into an appeal and dispose of it in accordance with law.The Court expressly refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, leaving it to the lower appellate Court to decide independently.Significant holdings include the following verbatim excerpt from the judgment:'...if by judicial interpretation a procedure to impose imprisonment in default of payment of compensation is acknowledged by treating 'compensation' as 'fine', the remedy of appeal available against such 'sentence of fine' must also be extended to 'orders of compensation'. To interpret otherwise would create an inequitable and unfair situation to the prejudice of an accused by permitting the Court to impose imprisonment in default of payment of compensation by treating it as a fine on the one hand but not permitting him to appeal against such order of compensation, on the other hand, since it is not a 'sentence of fine'.'And'...the legal fiction equating 'compensation' with 'fine' for the purposes of Section 64 of the I.P.C. and permitting the Court to pass direction for imprisonment in default of payment of such compensation would be unjust, unfair and unconstitutional if such legal fiction is not extended to the appellate remedy engrafted in Section 374 read with Section 376 of the Cr.P.C. and compensations which are coupled with a direction for imprisonment as a default clause are not made appealable under the aforesaid provision of law as if it were a 'sentence of fine'.'The core principle established is that when compensation awarded under Section 357 Cr.P.C. is treated as fine for the purpose of Section 64 I.P.C., the appellate remedy against the order of compensation must be available as if it were a sentence of fine under Sections 374 and 376 Cr.P.C., ensuring fairness and constitutionality in deprivation of liberty cases.This judgment clarifies the interplay between compensation orders, imprisonment in default of payment, and appeal rights, ensuring that accused persons are not deprived of statutory appellate remedies when their liberty is at stake due to non-payment of compensation treated as fine.