Limitation for court-martial starts when competent authority first learns of the offence; proceedings here were timely.

Section 122(1)(b) of the Army Act, 1950 was applied to hold that the three-year limitation for commencing a court-martial runs from the date the offence first comes to the knowledge of the authority competent to initiate action, not from earlier incomplete inquiries or general departmental awareness. The earlier correspondence and preliminary inquiry did not identify the respondent as responsible, but the Staff Court of Inquiry led to disciplinary action being directed on 3 December 1994. As proceedings began on 17 December 1996, the General Court Martial was held to be within limitation, the High Court's quashing order was unsustainable, and the limitation objection failed.

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Issues: Whether the trial by General Court Martial was barred by limitation under Section 122(1)(b) of the Army Act, 1950, and from which date the period of limitation commenced.

Analysis: Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950 prescribes a three-year period for commencement of trial by court-martial. Where the commission of the offence is not known to the person aggrieved or to the authority competent to initiate action, limitation begins from the first day on which the offence comes to the knowledge of such person or authority, whichever is earlier. In the context of an Army organisation, the expression "person aggrieved" was treated as inapplicable to the departmental hierarchy in the manner suggested by the respondent, and the decisive factor was the knowledge of the authority competent to initiate disciplinary action. The earlier correspondence and preliminary inquiry did not conclusively identify the respondent as responsible for the irregularities. The involvement of the respondent emerged after the Staff Court of Inquiry, and the competent authority then directed disciplinary action on 3 December 1994.

Conclusion: The trial by General Court Martial was within limitation, since the period of three years commenced on 3 December 1994 and the proceedings began on 17 December 1996. The limitation plea was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's judgment quashing the court-martial proceedings could not be sustained, and the appeal succeeded.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of Section 122(1)(b) of the Army Act, 1950, limitation begins when the offence comes to the knowledge of the authority competent to initiate action, and a court-martial commenced within three years from that date is not time-barred.

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