Section 245(3) CrPC discharge is not automatic; recorded testimony may suffice, and delay alone may not justify quashing.

Under Section 245(3) CrPC, discharge in a warrant-case on private complaint is not automatic merely because evidence under Section 244 remains incomplete within four years of the accused's appearance. Evidence already recorded may still be treated as evidence even if cross-examination is pending, and the Magistrate may refuse discharge where recorded material and special reasons show that discharge would be against the interest of justice. On the speedy-trial issue, prolonged delay did not by itself justify quashing the complaint where much of the delay arose from proceedings and challenges initiated by the accused, and the allegations required a full trial. The prosecution was allowed to continue and the trial was directed to proceed expeditiously.

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Issues: (i) Whether, in proceedings under Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the complainant's evidence already recorded but not yet tested by cross-examination could be treated as evidence, and whether the Magistrate could refuse discharge on the ground that it would not be in the interest of justice to do so. (ii) Whether the long delay in the criminal proceedings justified quashing the complaint on the ground of denial of the right to speedy trial.

Issue (i): Whether, in proceedings under Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the complainant's evidence already recorded but not yet tested by cross-examination could be treated as evidence, and whether the Magistrate could refuse discharge on the ground that it would not be in the interest of justice to do so.

Analysis: Section 245(3) applies to warrant-case trials arising from private complaints and incorporates the principle of speedy trial implicit in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The provision does not make discharge automatic merely because all the evidence under Section 244 has not been completed within four years of the accused's appearance. The evidence already recorded, though not yet cross-examined, is capable of being treated as evidence for the purpose of the section. The Magistrate must decide whether discharge would be against the interest of justice on the basis of the evidence already produced and special reasons, and may consider the nature of the allegations and the surrounding conduct relevant to delay.

Conclusion: The refusal to discharge the accused under Section 245(3) was upheld and the contention that the recorded testimony was not evidence was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the long delay in the criminal proceedings justified quashing the complaint on the ground of denial of the right to speedy trial.

Analysis: The delay had been occasioned largely by repeated proceedings and challenges raised by the accused, and the nature of the allegations required a full trial before the truth could be determined. The Court applied the principles governing speedy trial and held that, in the circumstances, the delay did not warrant termination of the prosecution. The Court also held that interference under Article 136 of the Constitution of India was not called for in the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The challenge to the continuation of the prosecution failed and the order declining to quash the proceedings was sustained.

Final Conclusion: The criminal proceedings were allowed to continue, the discharge application was rejected, and the challenge to quashing of the complaint was not accepted; the trial was directed to proceed expeditiously.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 245(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, discharge is not automatic on expiry of the prescribed period; the Magistrate may refuse discharge where the evidence already recorded and special reasons show that discharge would not be in the interest of justice, and delay attributable to the accused does not by itself establish a violation of the right to speedy trial sufficient to quash the prosecution.

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