Demand and acceptance in corruption cases must be proved first; statutory presumption cannot replace foundational evidence.

In a corruption prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act, the court found the evidence insufficient to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt. Material inconsistencies on the date of demand, the place and manner of handing over the envelope and currency, the arrest and recovery versions, and the absence of recovery from the accused's person undermined the prosecution case. The statutory presumption under Section 20 could not arise without proof of the foundational facts under Section 7, so the conviction was set aside and the accused was acquitted.

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Issues: Whether the conviction for offences under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act could be sustained on the evidence, and whether the prosecution proved demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt.

Analysis: The evidence was assessed for consistency on the alleged demand, the place and manner of payment, recovery of money, and the post-trap procedure. The discrepancies regarding the date of demand, the shifting version as to where the envelope and currency were handed over, the differing accounts of arrest and recovery, and the absence of recovery from the accused's person were treated as material rather than trivial. The presumption under Section 20 could arise only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification under Section 7, and the evidence was found insufficient to establish such foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt.

Conclusion: The conviction was not sustainable, and the accused was entitled to acquittal.

Final Conclusion: The impugned conviction was set aside and the appellant was acquitted of the charges, with release from bail obligations upon compliance with the directed bond requirement.

Ratio Decidendi: In a corruption prosecution, the statutory presumption cannot substitute for proof of the foundational facts of demand and acceptance, and material inconsistencies on those facts entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt.

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