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Issues: (i) Whether sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is vitiated if the appointing authority seeks and considers the opinion of the Central Vigilance Commission; (ii) Whether the period of three months, extendable by one month for legal consultation, for deciding a sanction proposal is mandatory and whether non-compliance warrants quashing of the criminal proceedings.
Issue (i): Whether sanction for prosecution under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is vitiated if the appointing authority seeks and considers the opinion of the Central Vigilance Commission.
Analysis: The statutory scheme governing corruption-related prosecution forms an integrated framework involving the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, the Central Vigilance Commission Act, 2003, and the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013. Within that framework, the Central Vigilance Commission is expressly empowered to tender advice to the Central Government and to review sanction proposals. Its opinion is advisory and may be a relevant input in the decision-making process, but the final decision must be that of the competent authority on its own independent application of mind. Seeking or considering such advice does not amount to acting under dictation, provided the authority retains and exercises its discretion.
Conclusion: The sanction was not vitiated merely because the appointing authority consulted and considered the Central Vigilance Commission; the challenge on non-application of mind failed.
Issue (ii): Whether the period of three months, extendable by one month for legal consultation, for deciding a sanction proposal is mandatory and whether non-compliance warrants quashing of the criminal proceedings.
Analysis: The amended proviso to Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was treated as imposing a compulsory time-bound obligation on the competent authority. The legislative history, the object of the amendment, and the public interest in prompt decisions on corruption prosecutions supported that construction. However, the consequence of breach was not held to be automatic quashing of the prosecution. Instead, delay triggers judicial review and accountability, and the aggrieved party may seek appropriate relief against inaction or unexplained delay. The Court declined to equate delay with an automatic termination of proceedings.
Conclusion: The three-month period, with a further one month for legal consultation, is mandatory, but delay does not by itself justify quashing the criminal proceedings.
Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, the sanction order was upheld, and the proceeding was allowed to stand; however, the Court clarified the remedies available where sanction is delayed beyond the statutory timeline.
Ratio Decidendi: Consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission does not invalidate sanction if the competent authority independently applies its mind, and the statutory time limit for deciding sanction is mandatory though its breach does not automatically extinguish the prosecution.