Reasonable classification upheld for Director (Finance) preference; writ relief refused beyond pleadings and expert selection left undisturbed.

Preference for Chartered Accountants over Cost Accountants for appointment as Director (Finance) in CPSEs was upheld as a valid qualification-based classification. The Court applied the doctrine of reasonable classification and held that Article 14 permits distinctions founded on intelligible differentia with a rational nexus to the post's financial management functions, so the preference was not hostile discrimination. It also held that mandamus could not be granted beyond the pleadings, and declined to strike down the preference clause because the petitioner did not challenge the underlying meeting minutes or the expert committee's constitution. Judicial interference with a duly constituted expert body was found unwarranted absent mala fides, bias, arbitrariness, or illegality.

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Issues: (i) Whether Cost Accountants can be treated as equivalent to Chartered Accountants for appointment as Director (Finance) in CPSEs and whether the preference given to Chartered Accountants violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India; (ii) Whether mandamus can be issued to delete the preference clause and whether the decision of the expert committee can be set aside in the absence of a challenge to the underlying minutes or to the committee's constitution.

Issue (i): Whether Cost Accountants can be treated as equivalent to Chartered Accountants for appointment as Director (Finance) in CPSEs and whether the preference given to Chartered Accountants violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The professions are governed by different statutory frameworks and are treated differently in some enactments. The post in question required overall financial management, accounts, audit, budgets and related advisory functions. The Court applied the doctrine of reasonable classification and held that Article 14 does not forbid classification founded on an intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. On that basis, preferring Chartered Accountants for the post was treated as a permissible qualification-based distinction and not as hostile discrimination.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

Issue (ii): Whether mandamus can be issued to delete the preference clause and whether the decision of the expert committee can be set aside in the absence of a challenge to the underlying minutes or to the committee's constitution.

Analysis: The Court held that though the writ of mandamus is wide, relief cannot be granted beyond the pleadings. Since the petitioner did not challenge the minutes of the meeting from which the preference clause originated, the Court declined to interfere with that decision. The Court also held that decisions of duly constituted expert bodies should not ordinarily be disturbed absent demonstrated mala fides, bias, arbitrariness, or a challenge to the committee's composition. The selection process was further viewed against the background that the petitioner had participated in the process and challenged it only after non-selection.

Conclusion: The issue was answered against the petitioner and in favour of the respondents.

Final Conclusion: The petition failed on merits because the classification was upheld, the relief sought could not be granted beyond the pleadings, and no ground was made out for judicial interference with the expert selection process.

Ratio Decidendi: A qualification-based preference in public employment is valid if it rests on reasonable classification with a rational nexus to the post, and a writ court will not grant relief not founded on the pleadings or ordinarily interfere with a duly constituted expert body's decision absent illegality, mala fides, or arbitrariness.

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