PMLA trial independence: pendency of appeal in the scheduled offence does not by itself justify postponement.

A revision against an order postponing commencement of trial under Section 309 CrPC was held maintainable because the challenge concerned the correctness and propriety of a criminal court order and was not treated as a purely interlocutory matter. On the PMLA issue, the Court held that the Act is a special regime with overriding effect, and that PMLA proceedings are independent of the scheduled offence; therefore, mere pendency of an appeal in the predicate case did not justify keeping the PMLA trial in abeyance. The order postponing the PMLA trial was set aside and the trial court was directed to proceed.

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Issues: (i) Whether a revision lay against the order postponing commencement of trial under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (ii) Whether pendency of the criminal appeal in the scheduled offence justified postponement of the PMLA trial.

Issue (i): Whether a revision lay against the order postponing commencement of trial under Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The order under challenge was one allowing an application to postpone commencement of trial. The revisional power under Section 397(1) extends to examination of the correctness, legality, or propriety of an order passed by the inferior criminal court. The bar under Section 397(2) applies only to purely interlocutory orders, and the order postponing trial was treated as amenable to revision on the facts of the case.

Conclusion: The revision petition was maintainable.

Issue (ii): Whether pendency of the criminal appeal in the scheduled offence justified postponement of the PMLA trial.

Analysis: The provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 operate as a special regime. Section 65 makes the Code of Criminal Procedure applicable only insofar as it is not inconsistent with the Act, and Section 71 gives the Act overriding effect. The Court treated PMLA proceedings, once initiated, as independent and distinct from the scheduled offence, and held that ECIR and the PMLA process cannot be equated with the FIR or trial in the predicate offence. Mere pendency of an appeal against conviction in the scheduled offence was not accepted as a sufficient ground to keep the PMLA trial in abeyance.

Conclusion: Postponement of the PMLA trial on the ground of pendency of the criminal appeal in the scheduled offence was not justified.

Final Conclusion: The order postponing the PMLA trial was set aside and the trial court was directed to proceed with the trial uninfluenced by observations on the facts of the case.

Ratio Decidendi: Proceedings under PMLA, being governed by a special statute with overriding effect, are independent of the scheduled offence, and pendency of an appeal in the predicate case does not by itself warrant postponement of the PMLA trial.

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