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Issues: (i) whether the prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act could proceed where the predicate offence was under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the accused had already been convicted in that case; (ii) whether mere continued possession of proceeds of crime was sufficient to attract the offence of money laundering and justify refusal of discharge; (iii) whether the plea of double jeopardy, the ceiling-based objection, and the challenge to the amendment effect could defeat the proceedings at the stage of discharge.
Issue (i): whether the prosecution under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act could proceed where the predicate offence was under the Prevention of Corruption Act and the accused had already been convicted in that case.
Analysis: The predicate offence and the money-laundering proceedings were treated as operating in distinct spheres. The existence of a conviction in the predicate offence did not by itself bar proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, because the relevant question was whether proceeds of crime continued to exist and remained in the possession of the accused when the Enforcement Directorate initiated action. The Act was held to have independent operation and to be aimed at economic offences with overriding effect.
Conclusion: The proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act were held maintainable and the objection based on the predicate conviction failed.
Issue (ii): whether mere continued possession of proceeds of crime was sufficient to attract the offence of money laundering and justify refusal of discharge.
Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 2(1)(u) defining proceeds of crime, Section 3 defining money laundering, and Section 24 dealing with burden of proof was applied. It was held that possession, concealment, acquisition, use, or projection of proceeds of crime as untainted property falls within the offence, and that mere possession of such proceeds is sufficient to invoke the Act. Questions going to the merits were held inappropriate for adjudication in a discharge petition.
Conclusion: The refusal to discharge was upheld because a prima facie case existed under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act.
Issue (iii): whether the plea of double jeopardy, the ceiling-based objection, and the challenge to the amendment effect could defeat the proceedings at the stage of discharge.
Analysis: The double jeopardy objection was rejected because the money-laundering offence was treated as distinct from the predicate offence. The ceiling-based argument and the challenge based on amendment effect were also rejected since the alleged proceeds of crime were still in existence when the case under the Act was initiated. These objections were treated as matters tied to the merits, to be examined at trial rather than at the discharge stage.
Conclusion: These objections were held not to warrant discharge or interference at the revision stage.
Final Conclusion: The order refusing discharge was sustained, the criminal revision was dismissed, and the trial was permitted to continue uninfluenced by observations on the merits.
Ratio Decidendi: Continued possession of proceeds of crime is sufficient to attract the offence of money laundering, and proceedings under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act are independent of the predicate offence and cannot be defeated at the discharge stage by merits-based objections or a double jeopardy plea.