Complaint withdrawal bars fresh prosecution on same facts; continuing-offence plea cannot defeat double jeopardy protection.

Withdrawal of a complaint results in acquittal by operation of law, even if the order does not expressly record acquittal, and a fresh complaint on the same facts and cause of action is barred by the rule against double jeopardy. The continuing-offence doctrine may affect limitation, but it does not justify successive prosecutions for the same omission after an earlier complaint has been withdrawn. In such circumstances, the High Court may exercise inherent jurisdiction to quash the complaints and summoning orders to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

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Issues: (i) Whether a second complaint based on the same facts and cause of action was barred after the earlier complaint had been dismissed as withdrawn, and whether such withdrawal had the legal effect of an acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution. (ii) Whether the plea that non-payment of provident fund dues was a continuing offence justified filing a fresh complaint and whether the High Court could quash the complaints and summoning orders in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether a second complaint based on the same facts and cause of action was barred after the earlier complaint had been dismissed as withdrawn, and whether such withdrawal had the legal effect of an acquittal under the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Constitution.

Analysis: When a complainant withdraws a complaint, the Magistrate is required to permit withdrawal and the accused is to be acquitted. The absence of an express recital of acquittal in the order does not change the legal consequence of withdrawal. Once such acquittal follows, a fresh complaint on the same facts and cause of action is barred by the rule against being tried again for the same offence and by the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The later complaint was founded on the same allegations, same defaults, same months, and same dues as the earlier withdrawn complaint.

Conclusion: The second complaint was not maintainable and was barred in law; the legal effect of the prior withdrawal was an acquittal.

Issue (ii): Whether the plea that non-payment of provident fund dues was a continuing offence justified filing a fresh complaint and whether the High Court could quash the complaints and summoning orders in exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

Analysis: The continuing-offence principle was held applicable in the context of limitation, but it could not be extended to permit successive prosecutions on the same omission after the first complaint had already been withdrawn. Treating every day of default as a fresh cause of action in such circumstances would lead to harassment and abuse of process. Where a second complaint is expressly barred by statute and the Constitution, the High Court may intervene under its inherent powers to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, and the accused need not first wait for trial-court reconsideration.

Conclusion: The continuing-offence argument failed, and the complaints and summoning orders were liable to be quashed under inherent jurisdiction.

Final Conclusion: The petitions succeeded because the later prosecution was barred by the prior withdrawal of the earlier complaint, and the proceedings constituted an abuse of process warranting quashing.

Ratio Decidendi: A complaint withdrawn by the complainant results in acquittal by operation of law, and a subsequent complaint on the same facts and cause of action is barred; the High Court may quash such proceedings to prevent abuse of process notwithstanding any continuing-offence argument.

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