Appellants lack standing to appeal decree cancelling sale agreement under Sections 96 and 100 CPC

SC dismissed appeals filed by appellants challenging HC's rejection of their leave to appeal application. Court held appellants lacked locus standi as they were neither parties to original suit nor aggrieved persons under Sections 96 and 100 CPC. The trial court decree cancelling agreement to sell did not prejudicially affect appellants' rights based on separate sale deeds executed under general power of attorney. Since judgment was not in rem and only binding between original parties, appellants failed to demonstrate they were adversely affected or had legal rights jeopardized to qualify as aggrieved persons entitled to appeal.

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Issues Involved:
1. Whether the appellants had the locus to question the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court.
2. Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the appellants' leave to appeal.

Detailed Analysis:

1. Locus Standi of the Appellants:
The appellants argued that their interests were directly involved in the subject matter of the suit because they had become absolute owners of the sites in question based on sale deeds executed by the General Power of Attorney holders of the recorded owners. They contended that the Trial Court's judgment, which held the sale agreements time-barred and granted a decree of permanent injunction, adversely affected their interests as they were in possession of the suit property.

The respondents countered that the appellants' claim was based on sale deeds executed by the General Power of Attorney holders and that these sale deeds were not referenced in the suit. Hence, the appellants had no locus to challenge the decree passed by the Trial Court.

The Supreme Court noted that Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure allow appeals from any original decree or decree in appeal, but do not specify who can file an appeal. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot file an appeal unless they fall within the category of aggrieved persons. The Court referred to various precedents, including Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha v. Golcha Properties Private Ltd. and State of Punjab and Ors. v. Amar Singh and Anr., which established that a person not party to a suit may prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court if they are prejudicially affected by the judgment.

The Court concluded that the appellants were neither aggrieved persons nor bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. The relief claimed in the suit was the cancellation of the agreement to sell, which had nothing to do with the sale deeds executed in favor of the appellants. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court were binding only between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, and not upon the appellants.

2. Justification of the High Court's Decision:
The High Court had dismissed the appellants' application for leave to appeal, observing that the declaratory relief granted by the Trial Court did not affect the appellants' interests. The appellants were advised to protect their possession by filing independent suits rather than challenging the judgment in the suit.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, stating that the appellants failed to demonstrate how the judgment and decree of the Trial Court adversely or prejudicially affected them. The decree was confined to a declaration regarding the agreement to sell and an injunction against the defendant society, with no mention of the sale deeds executed in favor of the appellants.

The Court emphasized that merely claiming to be prejudicially affected by the decree was insufficient. The appellants needed to demonstrate that their legal rights were adversely affected, which they failed to do. Consequently, the appellants were not considered 'persons aggrieved' and were not entitled to maintain an appeal against the decree.

Conclusion:
The Supreme Court found no infirmity in the High Court's judgment dismissing the appellants' application for leave to appeal. The appeals were dismissed, and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

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