Acquittal Suspension Counted as Leave: Employee Entitled to Salary & Benefits from 1975-1987 under Service Rules.

The HC dismissed the petition, affirming the MAT's ruling that the suspension period following the respondent's acquittal should be treated as permissible leave. Consequently, the respondent is entitled to receive salary and financial benefits for the period of absence from 3-9-1975 to 10-4-1987. The court clarified that under Rule 4(2)(a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979, suspension is deemed to have occurred upon detention exceeding 48 hours, irrespective of a formal order, and the appointing authority's discretion is limited to modifying or revoking the suspension.

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Issues:
1. Challenge to the order treating period of absence as duty
2. Validity of suspension and entitlement to financial benefits during absence
3. Interpretation of Rule 4(2)(a) of Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979

Detailed Analysis:

1. The petitioners challenged the order treating the period of absence of the original respondent as duty, which was from 3-9-1975 to 10-4-1987. The original respondent, an Accountant, was initially suspended due to a criminal case but was later acquitted. The petitioners argued that the respondent did not report to duty and was guilty of misconduct for not submitting leave applications. The Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal had ruled in favor of treating the absence period as duty for all purposes.

2. The petitioners contended that the respondent's suspension was valid due to serious misconduct as he did not report to duty without intimation and did not submit leave applications. They argued that the tribunal's decision to regularize the suspension period lacked merit. The respondents, on the other hand, supported the tribunal's decision based on Rule 4(2)(a) of the Maharashtra Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1979.

3. The key issue revolved around the interpretation of Rule 4(2)(a) regarding the deeming provision of suspension when a government servant is detained in police custody for more than 48 hours. The petitioners argued that the appointing authority must pass a suspension order, while the respondents relied on precedents like Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar and Anami Narayan Roy v. Suprakash Chakravarthy to support the immediate deeming of suspension upon completion of the detention period.

4. The court clarified that Rule 4(2)(a) creates a legal fiction where suspension is deemed to have occurred upon detention exceeding 48 hours, regardless of a formal order. Citing relevant judgments, the court emphasized that the appointing authority's discretion lies in modifying or revoking the suspension, not in initiating it. The court upheld the tribunal's decision that the suspension period post-acquittal should be considered as permissible leave, entitling the respondent to financial benefits.

In conclusion, the court dismissed the petition, affirming the tribunal's ruling that the suspension period after acquittal should be treated as permissible leave, and the respondent was entitled to receive his salary and benefits for that period.

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