Prospective stamp-duty amendment and secondary evidence rules govern unstamped agreement to sell before later liability arose.

An amendment creating a new stamp-duty obligation operates prospectively, so an agreement to sell executed before that amendment is not assessed by the later deeming provision and Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 does not bar its use. Secondary evidence may be received under Sections 61, 63 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 when the original is unavailable and the statutory foundation is proved, including proof that the copy is a true copy. The earlier ruling in Jupadi Kesava Rao was distinguishable because it concerned an instrument that was chargeable with duty but insufficiently stamped, unlike the present agreement executed before the liability arose.

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Issues: (i) whether the bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 applied to the agreement to sell executed on 04.02.1988; (ii) whether a copy of the document could be adduced as secondary evidence when the original was not in the party's possession; (iii) whether the earlier decision in Jupadi Kesava Rao governed the facts of the case.

Issue (i): whether the bar under Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 applied to the agreement to sell executed on 04.02.1988.

Analysis: The applicability of Section 35 depended on whether the instrument was chargeable with duty at the relevant time and whether it was not duly stamped. The Court held that stamp duty liability is determined with reference to the date of execution of the instrument. The amendment introducing the deeming explanation in Article 23 of Schedule I-A created a new obligation and could not be applied retrospectively to agreements executed before the amendment. Since the document in question was executed on 04.02.1988, it was not chargeable with duty at the relevant time.

Conclusion: The bar under Section 35 did not apply, and the finding was in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): whether a copy of the document could be adduced as secondary evidence when the original was not in the party's possession.

Analysis: Secondary evidence is governed by Sections 61, 63 and 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and may be permitted when the original is unavailable and the foundational requirements are satisfied. A copy may be received as secondary evidence if the party establishes the circumstances bringing the case within Section 65 and proves that the copy is a true copy of the original. The Court held that the document could be taken on record as secondary evidence, with admissibility to be decided independently in accordance with law.

Conclusion: A copy of the document could be adduced as secondary evidence if the legal requirements were met, and the finding was in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): whether the decision in Jupadi Kesava Rao governed the facts of the case.

Analysis: The earlier decision concerned an instrument that was chargeable with duty but insufficiently stamped. The present case was materially different because the agreement to sell was not chargeable with duty at the relevant time of execution. On that factual distinction, the earlier ruling did not control the present dispute.

Conclusion: Jupadi Kesava Rao was distinguishable and did not bar secondary evidence in the present case.

Final Conclusion: The retrospective application of the stamping amendment was rejected, the evidentiary objection failed, and the appellant was entitled to have the copy considered as secondary evidence in accordance with law.

Ratio Decidendi: A stamping amendment that creates a new obligation operates prospectively, and Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 bars secondary evidence only where the original instrument was chargeable with duty and not duly stamped at the relevant time.

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