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Issues: Whether the six-month period prescribed for service of show cause notice under Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act could be computed by excluding the date of seizure by applying the General Clauses Act, and whether service of notice one day beyond six months was valid.
Analysis: Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act was treated as a special provision laying down both the procedure for notice and the period of limitation. The service requirement was held to be mandatory, and the Court relied on the earlier Supreme Court rulings noticed by the single Judge to hold that there was no scope to invoke the General Clauses Act for excluding the date of seizure. Since the notices were admittedly served beyond six months by one day, the statutory condition for valid adjudication was not satisfied.
Conclusion: The notice was time-barred and invalid, and adjudication under Section 79 of the Gold (Control) Act could not proceed.
Final Conclusion: The writ appeals were rejected because the show cause notices were served beyond the permissible limitation period, leaving no valid basis for adjudication.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a special statute prescribes a limitation period for service of notice, the period must be strictly computed according to that statute, and the General Clauses Act cannot be used to extend it unless the statute so permits.