Appellate interference with ex parte injunctions in defamation disputes remains limited absent perversity or arbitrariness.

Appellate interference with an ex parte ad interim injunction in a defamation suit is confined to cases where the order is arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or contrary to settled principles governing temporary injunctions. The court stressed that discretion should not be substituted merely because the injunction was granted ex parte at an early stage, especially where the order reflected consideration of reputational harm, alleged business impact, the absence of SEBI findings, and prima facie satisfaction of the triple test. The availability of ordinary trial-court remedies, including reply and modification, was also relevant. On that basis, the injunction order was left undisturbed and the appeal was dismissed.

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Issues: Whether the appellate court should interfere with the ex parte ad interim injunction granted in a defamation suit and whether the impugned order disclosed such arbitrariness, perversity, or non-compliance with procedural requirements as would warrant appellate interference.

Analysis: The appeal challenged an interlocutory order granting ex parte ad interim injunction and directing takedown and restraint against further publication. The governing principles for interference with a discretionary injunction are limited: an appellate court does not substitute its own view unless the order is shown to be arbitrary, capricious, perverse, or rendered in disregard of settled principles governing temporary injunctions. The order under challenge, read as a whole, recorded consideration of the grievance of defamation, the alleged impact on reputation and business, the asserted lack of SEBI findings, and the prima facie satisfaction of the triple test for injunction. The Court also noted that the appellants had not yet availed the ordinary course of filing a reply or seeking modification before the trial court, which was still seized of the interim application. The procedural safeguard under the temporary injunction regime was treated as important, but the existence of an ex parte order at an early stage did not by itself justify appellate substitution of discretion.

Conclusion: The injunction order did not call for interference and the appeal was dismissed.

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