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<h1>Tribunal Overturns Rejection of Refund Claim, Finds Appeal Timely Filed; Case Remanded for New Decision on Merits.</h1> <h3>M/s Confirmation. Com India Pvt. Ltd. Versus Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Mumbai East</h3> The Tribunal set aside the impugned order dated 30.09.2019, which had rejected the appellant's refund claims due to a purported delay in filing the ... Refund claim - time limitation - date of service of the order - determination of delay - appeal filed belatedly beyond the prescribed period of 60 days in terms of Section 85(3A) of Finance Act, 1994 or not - HELD THAT:- There is no specific date mentioned either in the face of the order or the date of the order in the preamble. Further, there is no evidence on record before me to state that the appellant had received the original order in time and there was delay in filing the appeal beyond the prescribed 60 days time. In the absence of any evidence or documents produced by the Department for dispatch of the original order and its receipt by the appellant; or by any independent evidence, such as records of the postal authorities to support the same, the stand taken in the impugned order cannot be accepted that the original order was sent in time and the delay in filing appeal is on account of the appellant. By taking note of the claim of the appellant that the said original order was received on 26.11.2018, it is found that the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) had been filed on 23.01.2019 i.e. within 57 days. Thus, appeal filed by the appellant is eligible to be considered under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994. The appeal is allowed by of remand to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh decision on merits. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether an appeal against an Order-in-Original is time-barred under Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 where the departmental records do not show date of dispatch or receipt of the original order. 2. Whether, in absence of evidence of departmental dispatch/receipt and postal records, the appellant's assertion of the date of receipt of the original order can be accepted for computing the 60-day limitation under Section 85(3A). 3. Whether the appellate authority's decision to reject an appeal solely on the ground of delay (without deciding merits) is sustainable when the factual matrix about service/receipt is indeterminate. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Time-bar under Section 85(3A) when departmental records lack dispatch/receipt evidence Legal framework: Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 prescribes a 60-day period for filing an appeal from the date of receipt of the Order-in-Original; computation depends on the date the order is received by the appellant. Precedent treatment: The bench considered a High Court decision (G. Muthukumar) accepting a party's claim of delayed receipt where there was no evidence of departmental dispatch or specific proof of receipt; that precedent was relied upon by the appellant and treated as instructive. Interpretation and reasoning: Where the Order-in-Original lacks any entered 'date of issue' or 'date of order' and departmental records/personal office copies do not indicate dispatch or receipt particulars, the presumption of timely dispatch by the department cannot be sustained without corroborative evidence (e.g., departmental dispatch memo, postal records). Absent such evidence, the appellant's asserted date of receipt is a plausible basis for computing the limitation period. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - In situations with no documentary evidence of dispatch/receipt and no date on the face of the order, the appellate time limit must be computed from the date of receipt as asserted by the appellant unless the department produces evidence to the contrary. Obiter - The general comment that the face-of-order signature date may be a basis to presume dispatch is contextual and not a rigid rule. Conclusion: The appeal cannot be held time-barred solely on the basis that the original order was signed earlier; in absence of evidence establishing dispatch and receipt, the appellant's claimed receipt date should be accepted for limitation computation. Issue 2 - Acceptance of appellant's claimed date of receipt in absence of independent evidence Legal framework: Principles governing service and computing limitation require proof of service/receipt; where official records are silent, independent evidence (postal records, dispatch registers) is ordinarily necessary for the department to rebut an appellant's claimed receipt date. Precedent treatment: The tribunal followed the approach in G. Muthukumar that condoned delay when the department failed to produce evidence of dispatch/receipt; that precedent was applied rather than distinguished or overruled. Interpretation and reasoning: The impugned Order-in-Original lacked entries for 'date of order' and 'date of issue'; the only signature bore a signing date (28.02.2018) but no dispatch proof. The department produced no office or postal records showing dispatch or receipt. Given this evidentiary gap, the appellant's claim of receiving the order on 26.11.2018 was held to be acceptable. The Tribunal emphasized that the onus to show dispatch/receipt lies with the department when it asserts that an appeal is belated. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where the department asserts delay but fails to produce documentary or postal proof of dispatch/receipt, the appellant's uncontested assertion of the date of receipt can be accepted for computing the limitation period. Obiter - The observation that the appellant's current address differing from that in the order did not amount to mistaken address in dispatch is factual and case-specific. Conclusion: The appellant's date of receipt was accepted; consequently the appeal filed within 57 days of that date fell within the 60-day period prescribed by Section 85(3A). Issue 3 - Competency of an appellate order that decides only limitation without reaching merits Legal framework: An appellate tribunal/authority may dismiss an appeal as time-barred if limitation is not met; conversely, if limitation is established, the appeal must be remitted or decided on merits. Precedent treatment: The tribunal did not expressly overrule any precedent on competence to decide only limitation, but remedied the situation by setting aside the impugned order that had decided only on limitation and remanding for merits since time-bar was found not to apply. Interpretation and reasoning: Since the impugned order considered only the question of time limit and rejected the appeal as belated, and because the factual conclusion on delay could not be sustained for lack of departmental evidence, the proper course was to set aside that order and remand the matter for a fresh decision on merits by the Commissioner (Appeals). The Tribunal found that remand was necessary to enable adjudication on substantive refund claims now that the procedural hurdle of limitation was resolved in favour of the appellant. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where an appeal is held to be within time after proper factual and evidentiary assessment, the appellate authority must decide the appeal on merits (remand appropriate if the lower appellate order declined to do so). Obiter - Observations about the office copy lacking dispatch entries are factual and not intended as a categorical rule about departmental record-keeping. Conclusion: The impugned order that dismissed the appeal as time-barred was set aside and the appeal remanded to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication on merits, since the appeal was held to be filed within the statutory 60-day period.