Rebuttal of statutory presumption in cheque dishonour cases defeated the complaint despite challenge to the complainant's financial capacity.

A request to recall the complainant and produce income-tax returns and financial-capacity material at the appellate stage was treated as an application for additional evidence under Section 391 CrPC and rejected because the documents were available during trial and no sufficient reason was shown for earlier non-production. In the appeal against acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, interference was declined because the trial court's view was a possible one and the accused had rebutted the Section 139 presumption on a preponderance of probabilities. The complainant's admissions on limited income, failure to prove the source of funds, and lack of corroboration from alleged lenders supported the defence of no enforceable debt.

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Issues: (i) Whether the complainant was entitled to recall himself and lead additional evidence at the appellate stage to prove the income tax returns and financial capacity. (ii) Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference in appeal in view of the presumption under Section 139 and the defence of tampering and lack of financial capacity.

Issue (i): Whether the complainant was entitled to recall himself and lead additional evidence at the appellate stage to prove the income tax returns and financial capacity.

Analysis: The requested material was available to the complainant during trial, and no convincing reason was shown for not producing it earlier. The application, though styled under Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, was in substance one for additional evidence governed by Section 391 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Such power is to be exercised sparingly and not to permit a party to fill up gaps in its case.

Conclusion: The application for recalling and additional evidence was not maintainable in the circumstances and was rightly rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 called for interference in appeal in view of the presumption under Section 139 and the defence of tampering and lack of financial capacity.

Analysis: In an appeal against acquittal, interference is warranted only when the trial court's view is perverse or not a possible view. The trial court's reliance on an unproved handwriting expert report was held to be erroneous, but the acquittal still survived on the independent ground of rebuttal of the statutory presumption. The complainant's own admissions regarding limited annual income and inability to establish the source of funds, coupled with the absence of corroboration from the persons from whom money was allegedly borrowed, made the defence of no debt or liability probable. The accused was required only to rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities, which was done.

Conclusion: The presumption under Section 139 stood rebutted and the acquittal did not warrant interference.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court declined to disturb the trial court's dismissal of the complaint, as the complainant failed to establish financial capacity and the accused had raised a probable defence sufficient to displace the statutory presumption.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the appellate court will not interfere with a possible view of the trial court, and the statutory presumption of liability stands rebutted when the accused establishes a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities, including by challenging the complainant's financial capacity.

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