Statutory presumptions in cheque dishonour cases prevail unless the accused proves a probable defence on preponderance of probabilities.

Delay in filing the appeal before the appellate court was found not fit for condonation because the complainant had no opportunity to oppose it, the accused had remained absent despite service, was declared a proclaimed person, and gave no acceptable explanation for the long delay. On the merits, once the cheque, return memo, notice, postal acknowledgment, signature and issuance were admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operated in favour of the complainant. The accused failed to rebut them on a preponderance of probabilities; the plea of a smaller loan, security cheque and part repayment was not consistently proved, and a reply or statement under Section 313 CrPC was insufficient. The acquittal was therefore held unsustainable and the conviction and sentence were restored.

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Issues: (i) Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the appellate court was liable to be condoned. (ii) Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 so as to justify acquittal under Section 138 of that Act.

Issue (i): Whether the delay in filing the appeal before the appellate court was liable to be condoned.

Analysis: The complainant was not given an opportunity to oppose the application for condonation. The accused had remained absent despite service, was declared a proclaimed person, and even after conviction did not file the appeal within time or surrender. The explanation that counsel had not informed him of the decision was found unacceptable in view of his conduct and the long delay.

Conclusion: The delay ought not to have been condoned and the order condoning delay was set aside.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 so as to justify acquittal under Section 138 of that Act.

Analysis: The cheque, return memo, notice, and postal acknowledgment were proved. The accused admitted his signature and issuance of the cheque at multiple stages. Once execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arise in favour of the complainant. The accused was required to rebut them on a preponderance of probabilities, but his plea of a smaller loan, security cheque, and part repayment was neither consistently established nor supported by effective confrontation in cross-examination. His reply to notice was sent after the complaint had already been filed, and his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not substantive evidence. The appellate court's reliance on conjectures, including Sections 58 and 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, was held to be misplaced.

Conclusion: The accused failed to rebut the presumption of legally enforceable liability, and the acquittal was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The revision succeeded, the acquittal was reversed, and the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court were restored.

Ratio Decidendi: Once execution of a cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 operate in favour of the holder, and the accused can displace them only by a probable defence shown on a preponderance of probabilities; a bare denial or an unsubstantiated version in reply or under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is insufficient.

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