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Issues: (i) Whether the concurrent findings sustaining conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 suffered from misreading and non-consideration of material evidence warranting revisional interference. (ii) Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by raising a probable defence against the existence of a legally enforceable debt.
Issue (i): Whether the concurrent findings sustaining conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 suffered from misreading and non-consideration of material evidence warranting revisional interference.
Analysis: Revisional interference is limited to cases of manifest illegality, perversity, gross error, or palpable misreading of records. The material on record showed that the agreement, the reply notice, the defence version, and the testimony of the defence witnesses were not meaningfully analysed by the courts below. The findings were sustained mainly on the documents without proper appreciation of the oral evidence and without examining whether the foundational facts for liability were established.
Conclusion: The concurrent findings were vitiated by misreading and inadequate consideration of material evidence, and therefore called for interference in revision.
Issue (ii): Whether the accused had rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by raising a probable defence against the existence of a legally enforceable debt.
Analysis: A cheque carries a presumption of consideration and of discharge of debt, but the presumption is rebuttable on a standard of preponderance of probabilities. The defence that the cheques were issued as security for obtaining dealership, coupled with the absence of convincing evidence that the complainant was a partner in the firm and the non-examination of material witnesses, created doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt. The complainant's evidence also did not satisfactorily establish the transactional foundation asserted in the complaint.
Conclusion: The accused had raised a probable defence sufficient to rebut the statutory presumption, and the conviction under Section 138 could not be sustained on the material as appreciated by the revisional court.
Final Conclusion: The matter was sent back for fresh appellate consideration after the conviction and appellate affirmation were set aside, with the appeal to be decided anew on its own merits.
Ratio Decidendi: In a cheque dishonour prosecution, once the accused raises a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities, the statutory presumption of liability stands rebutted; if the lower courts ignore material evidence or misread the record, revisional interference is justified.