Issues: (i) Whether an importer using forged or manipulated transferable duty-credit scrips through an authorised customs-clearance agent can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser; (ii) Whether non-production of original scrips and allied documents, and denial of cross-examination of Customs officers, vitiate the proceedings for breach of natural justice; (iii) Whether penalties under Sections 112 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable where the importer claims lack of actual knowledge of the manipulation.

Issue (i): Whether an importer using forged or manipulated transferable duty-credit scrips through an authorised customs-clearance agent can claim protection as a bona fide purchaser.

Analysis: An authorised agent's acts within the scope of authority are attributable to the importer under Sections 182, 186 and 226 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 and Section 147 of the Customs Act, 1962. The importer authorised the agent to undertake customs clearance and utilise scrips, obtained the resulting duty benefit, and could not disclaim the consequences of that agency.

Analysis: The equitable principle underlying Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 requires good faith and reasonable care. The excess value reflected in manipulated EDI records was never part of the entitlement issued by the DGFT and could not be transferred under the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. The importer neither verified the scrips, their source, validity or available balance, nor questioned material irregularities in the clearance arrangements. Caveat emptor required such due diligence.

Conclusion: The importer cannot claim bona fide purchaser protection or avoid liability for duty benefits derived from manipulated scrips. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether non-production of original scrips and allied documents, and denial of cross-examination of Customs officers, vitiate the proceedings for breach of natural justice.

Analysis: The evidentiary basis comprised DGFT entitlement data, customs registration records, EDI transaction trails, electronic records and statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. Under Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, an adverse inference from non-production is discretionary and does not arise where the relevant facts are independently established.

Analysis: The importer had never possessed or independently verified the disputed original scrips and did not establish any actual prejudice from their absence. The denial of cross-examination likewise did not invalidate the proceedings because no material fact or resulting prejudice was identified.

Conclusion: The proceedings are not vitiated by non-production of original documents or denial of cross-examination. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalties under Sections 112 and 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable where the importer claims lack of actual knowledge of the manipulation.

Analysis: Section 114A applies where duty is short-levied through fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression intended to evade duty. The importer filed Bills of Entry relying on scrips without verifying their existence, validity or credit balance, and directly benefited from the manipulated credits. Personal execution of the electronic manipulation was not necessary for the statutory penalty.

Analysis: The proviso to Section 114A excludes a separate penalty under Section 112 where penalty is imposed under Section 114A.

Conclusion: Penalty under Section 114A is sustained, while the separate penalty under Section 112 is set aside. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The findings apply equally to the connected writ matters arising from the same investigation, and the customs-duty consequences founded on the manipulated duty-credit scrips remain enforceable subject to removal of the separate Section 112 penalty.

Ratio Decidendi: An importer that authorises an agent to use transferable duty-credit scrips and obtains the resulting benefit remains responsible for manipulated or excess credits where it failed to exercise reasonable diligence; absence of original instruments does not invalidate proceedings supported by independent reliable evidence and absent demonstrable prejudice.

Issues: Whether service tax paid on a contractual advance, where no service was rendered and the entire advance was recovered upon termination of the contract, was refundable without the limitation under Section 11B.

Analysis: The contractual advance was received against a project that was terminated before commencement, and no service was provided or consideration adjusted against contractual performance. The entire advance was recovered through encashment of the bank guarantee, while the incidence of the tax payment remained with the assessee. A payment made where no taxable service was rendered does not retain the character of service tax legally payable; it is a deposit with the Revenue. Consequently, the refund limitation applicable to duty under Section 11B did not govern the claim. In any event, the entitlement to refund arose upon termination of the contract and recovery of the advance.

Conclusion: The refund claim was not time-barred under Section 11B, and the assessee was entitled to refund with consequential relief.

Issues: Whether a show-cause notice issued after expiry of the limitation applicable to non-fraud cases could be sustained under the extended limitation provision on a bare allegation of fraud or concealment of facts.

Analysis: The limitation for a notice under Section 73 for the relevant financial year, after accounting for extension of the annual-return filing date and exclusion of the COVID-19 period, expired on 28.02.2025. The impugned notice dated 13.06.2025 was consequently time-barred under that provision. Invocation of Section 74 required the notice itself to disclose allegations and material indicating fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts. A counter affidavit could not supplement deficiencies in the notice. The notice merely used the expression "fraud or concealment of facts" without identifying how either was inferred or detected, demonstrating an unsupported and mechanical invocation of the extended limitation.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice could not validly be sustained under Section 74 and was barred by limitation; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: Extended limitation founded on fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts is invocable only where the show-cause notice itself sets out the allegations and material supporting that basis; such defects cannot be cured through pleadings filed before the Court.

Issues: Whether penalty for transport of goods without an e-way bill at the time of interception could be sustained where the e-way bill was generated shortly thereafter and the transaction was genuine, fully documented and unaccompanied by evidence of intent to evade tax.

Analysis: Section 129(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 was invoked because the e-way bill required under Rule 138(1) had not been generated when the vehicle was intercepted. The e-way bill was generated about nine minutes later and produced immediately. The motorcycles were traceable through invoices, engine and chassis numbers and registration requirements; purchase and sale invoices, challans, ledgers and bank records supported the transaction. No discrepancy in quantity, value or classification, or material indicating suppression, undervaluation, fake documents, unaccounted goods or tax evasion, was established. The lapse was therefore bona fide and procedural rather than part of an attempt to evade tax.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 129(3) was not sustainable and the penalty orders were liable to be set aside.

Issues: Whether reassessment could be initiated on the basis of alleged incorrect computation of loss following a share split when the underlying share transactions and valuation had already been scrutinised in the original assessment.

Analysis: The original scrutiny assessment specifically sought details of the purchase and sale of the relevant shares, the disparity between their purchase and sale prices, the applicable rates, unquoted-share holdings, and the capital gain or loss. Complete transaction, valuation, allotment and banking records were furnished, following which the assessment was completed. The reopening reasons relied on the same share transactions and the consequence of their 1:10 split, without identifying fresh tangible material or any non-disclosure of material facts.

Conclusion: Reopening on the self-same issue constituted an impermissible change of opinion and was in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A completed scrutiny assessment cannot be reopened merely by revisiting material and transactions already examined; reassessment requires fresh tangible material indicating escaped income and, where applicable, failure to make full and true disclosure.

Issues: Whether reassessment notices alleging that the partner had failed to disclose taxable interest on capital and remuneration purportedly receivable from the partnership firm were valid.

Analysis: The partnership deeds made payment of interest and remuneration dependent on mutual agreement and were therefore enabling rather than mandatory. The amended deed effective from 01.04.2009 expressly provided that no interest on partners' capital was payable, and no material established actual receipt of interest or remuneration by the petitioner. The reopening proceeded on an erroneous assumption that such amounts were necessarily payable merely because earlier deed clauses contemplated them. The identical basis for reopening the firm's assessments had already been found legally unsustainable.

Conclusion: The reassessment notices were without jurisdiction and were quashed, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether cash deposits made during the demonetisation period, stated to represent cash sales already reflected in the assessee's business results, could be assessed as unexplained cash credit.

Analysis: The purchases, stock-in-trade and sales were not doubted. Given the nature of the trading business, undisputed purchases reasonably supported corresponding sales. The increased bank deposits during demonetisation could result from the inability to use demonetised currency for cash purchases or expenditure, requiring available cash to be deposited in the bank. Since the profit embedded in the cash sales had already been offered to tax, treating the sale proceeds again as unexplained income would result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The cash deposits could not be treated as unexplained cash credit; the addition was deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the entire gross professional receipts could be assessed as professional income where no return was filed and the assessee had offered 50% of such receipts as income.

Analysis: The assessment of professional income must reflect net income and not automatically the entire gross receipts merely because the assessee did not file a return or comply with assessment notices. Although acceptance of presumptive income in subsequent years under Section 44ADA does not itself confer the statutory benefit for the year in question, it is relevant in assessing the reasonableness of the income offered where the same profession continued and no material change in the earning activity was shown. The assessee's offer of 50% of receipts, payment of tax thereon, and the Revenue's consistent acceptance of that basis in subsequent years supported a reasonable estimation at 50% of gross receipts.

Conclusion: Professional income was directed to be assessed at 50% of gross professional receipts, amounting to Rs. 17,50,750, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the Appellate Tribunal may refuse to admit an assessee's appeal solely because the amount involved is below two lakh rupees, without giving reasons on the merits.

Analysis: The second proviso to Section 35B(1) confers discretion on the Appellate Tribunal to refuse admission of specified appeals involving fine or penalty not exceeding two lakh rupees. That discretion does not dispense with the Tribunal's obligation, as a statutory quasi-judicial forum, to provide reasons. Reasons are integral to a valid adjudicatory decision. The Tribunal must consider the appeal and, if it finds on merits that admission is unwarranted, record reasons for refusing admission.

Conclusion: The Tribunal could not dismiss the appeals merely on the monetary limit without a reasoned consideration; the matter was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether sponsorship receipts from a women's marathon constituted receipts from trade, commerce or business so as to attract the proviso to section 2(15) and section 13(8); (ii) Whether furnishing Form No. 10BB instead of Form No. 10B with the return precluded exemption under section 11.

Issue (i): Whether sponsorship receipts from a women's marathon constituted receipts from trade, commerce or business so as to attract the proviso to section 2(15) and section 13(8).

Analysis: The marathon was directly connected with the charitable objects concerning women's health, fitness, awareness and empowerment. An object clause need not enumerate every programme or means adopted to fulfil its charitable ends. The treatment of sponsorship payments as advertising expenditure by sponsors did not determine the character of receipts in the hands of the charitable recipient. The quantum of sponsorship or surplus was not, by itself, determinative of commerciality; the decisive inquiry was the intrinsic nature, purpose and manner of the activity. No independent commercial undertaking or commercial services distinct from the charitable event were established. The 20% receipts test applied by the appellate authority was also inapplicable to the relevant assessment year.

Conclusion: The sponsorship receipts did not arise from trade, commerce or business; the proviso to section 2(15) and section 13(8) were inapplicable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether furnishing Form No. 10BB instead of Form No. 10B with the return precluded exemption under section 11.

Analysis: The accounts had been audited before the return was filed, the assessee held valid registration under section 12A, and the correct Form No. 10B was furnished during assessment proceedings before completion of assessment. The incorrect form resulted from an erroneous claim under section 10(23C)(iv), and did not affect the substantive availability of the exemption claim or prevent its examination on merits.

Conclusion: The procedural error in furnishing the incorrect audit form did not extinguish the assessee's entitlement to exemption under section 11. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessee was entitled to exemption under section 11 and the surplus assessed on denial of such exemption was liable to be deleted.

Ratio Decidendi: Sponsorship associated with an activity genuinely and integrally undertaken to achieve charitable objects does not become trade, commerce or business merely because sponsors obtain promotional benefit or the activity generates substantial receipts or surplus; a curable procedural defect cannot defeat a substantively valid charitable exemption claim.

Issues: Whether a penalty notice under Section 271(1)(c) that does not specify whether proceedings are for concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars is valid.

Analysis: The two limbs of Section 271(1)(c), connected by the disjunctive expression "or", are independent grounds. The notice must identify the precise limb invoked so that the assessee has a meaningful opportunity to answer the allegation. A general notice retaining both alternatives is not a mere procedural irregularity, since it fails to satisfy the foundational jurisdictional requirement for penalty proceedings. The precedents concerning recording of satisfaction in the assessment order and non-reference to the Explanations to the provision were distinguishable.

Conclusion: A notice that does not specify the applicable limb of Section 271(1)(c) is invalid, and the consequential penalty cannot be sustained; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: For penalty under Section 271(1)(c), the statutory notice must clearly state whether the charge is concealment of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars; failure to do so vitiates the penalty proceedings.

Issues: Whether penalty for failure to furnish transfer-pricing documentation could be sustained where the penalty notice did not identify the specific information or documents allegedly not furnished, and the transfer-pricing study report was furnished in response to the specific notice under Section 92D(3).

Analysis: Penalty under Section 271G requires a failure to furnish identified information or documentation requisitioned under Section 92D(3). The notice initiating penalty proceedings was ambiguous because it did not specify the documents allegedly not furnished. The earlier notices relied upon were issued under Section 92CA(2), not under Section 92D(3), and did not establish a requisition requiring production within the statutory period. The specific notice under Section 92D(3) was answered within the prescribed period by furnishing the transfer-pricing study report. As the provision is penal and imposes penalty computed at two per cent of the value of international transactions, its procedural requirements require strict adherence.

Conclusion: The statutory prerequisites for imposition of penalty under Section 271G were not satisfied; the penalty was invalid.

Issues: (i) Whether corporate-guarantee commission was correctly restricted to 1%; (ii) Whether interest on loans advanced to associated enterprises should be computed at LIBOR alone or with a basis-point spread; (iii) Whether notional interest was chargeable on delayed receivables from associated enterprises; (iv) Whether the claim for brought-forward losses required verification.

Issue (i): Whether corporate-guarantee commission was correctly restricted to 1%.

Analysis: The earlier coordinate-bench decision for the assessee's own case had treated a 1% guarantee commission as fair and reasonable, having regard to inter-group guarantee rates and the assessee's own charging pattern. The same position governed the year under consideration.

Conclusion: Restriction of the corporate-guarantee adjustment to 1% was sustained, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether interest on loans advanced to associated enterprises should be computed at LIBOR alone or with a basis-point spread.

Analysis: Although an earlier order had restricted the adjustment to LIBOR, the applicable market rate for such foreign loans was found to require a basis-point spread. LIBOR plus 200 basis points was treated as normal and reasonable.

Conclusion: Interest on outstanding loans shall be benchmarked at LIBOR plus 200 basis points, partly in favour of the Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether notional interest was chargeable on delayed receivables from associated enterprises.

Analysis: The assessee had not charged interest on delayed payments from non-associated enterprises despite substantial sales to them. On that comparable conduct, no notional interest adjustment on receivables from associated enterprises was justified.

Conclusion: No notional interest adjustment on outstanding associated-enterprise receivables was permissible, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether the claim for brought-forward losses required verification.

Analysis: The premise that prior appellate directions had conclusively allowed the claim was not borne out by the earlier orders. Verification of the losses and unabsorbed depreciation was therefore necessary.

Conclusion: The brought-forward-loss claim was remitted for verification and consequential allowance in accordance with law.

Final Conclusion: The transfer-pricing adjustment for loans is limited to LIBOR plus 200 basis points; the 1% corporate-guarantee benchmark and deletion of receivables interest remain undisturbed, while the loss claim awaits verification.

Ratio Decidendi: In transfer-pricing benchmarking, an arm's-length interest rate for cross-border loans may include an appropriate LIBOR spread, whereas delayed associated-enterprise receivables cannot attract notional interest where comparable delayed payments by non-associated enterprises are interest-free.

Issues: (i) Classification of roasted walnuts; (ii) Eligibility of roasted walnuts for preferential customs-duty benefit.

Issue (i): Classification of roasted walnuts.

Analysis: Tariff classification is governed by Rule 1 of the General Rules for Interpretation, the terms of the headings, and relevant Section and Chapter Notes. Heading 2008 covers fruit, nuts and other edible parts of plants otherwise prepared or preserved. Roasting is distinct from drying: it is a high-heat treatment producing physical and chemical changes in the product. The processes specified for Chapter 8 do not include roasting, while Tariff Item 2008 19 91 specifically covers other roasted nuts and seeds. HSN Explanatory Notes and common trade understanding support this specific classification.

Conclusion: Roasted walnuts are classifiable under Tariff Item 2008 19 91 as other roasted nuts and seeds, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Eligibility of roasted walnuts for preferential customs-duty benefit.

Analysis: The claimed preferential basic customs-duty exemption under Notification No. 46/2011-Cus, as amended by Notification No. 41/2019, depends upon proof of origin to the satisfaction of the competent customs officer in accordance with the applicable ASEAN-India origin rules and the Customs (Administration of Rules of Origin under Trade Agreements) Rules, 2020.

Conclusion: The preferential duty benefit is available only upon satisfactory proof that the goods originate in the relevant notified country, in favour of the assessee subject to fulfilment of the origin requirement.

Final Conclusion: The ruling confirms the tariff treatment of roasted walnuts and recognises their potential entitlement to the notified preferential rate upon compliance with origin requirements.

Ratio Decidendi: Nuts subjected to roasting, being a process distinct from drying and specifically covered by the tariff, are classifiable under the specific entry for other roasted nuts and seeds.

Issues: Whether Section 96(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, inserted with effect from 26.05.2026, applies to pending insolvency applications concerning personal guarantors to corporate debtors and removes the interim-moratorium bar to the suit.

Analysis: Section 96(4) was introduced to address misuse of the interim moratorium by personal guarantors who initiated insolvency proceedings to obstruct recovery action. The amendment operates prospectively upon the existing status of a pending insolvency application and is retroactive or quasi-retroactive, rather than truly retrospective. The expression "is filed" encompasses applications filed before the amendment that remained pending when it came into force. The removal of the pre-admission protection does not impair a vested right, but restores creditors' ability to pursue remedies during pending proceedings.

Conclusion: Section 96(4) applies to the pending Section 95 application; the interim moratorium in favour of the personal guarantor stood vacated from the amendment's effective date, and the suit is not barred. The application for rejection of the plaint was rejected.

Issues: Whether the impugned anti-profiteering determinations concerning real-estate projects required fresh consideration under the project-specific methodology prescribed for computing profiteering benefit.

Analysis: The real-estate methodology based on the difference between input-tax-credit-to-turnover ratios in the pre-GST and post-GST periods was identified as unsuitable because construction expenditure, input-tax-credit accrual and buyer collections are not uniform throughout a project's lifecycle. The applicable approach requires computation of the total GST-related saving for each project and allocation of that saving on the basis of the total project area, so that purchasers of equivalent area receive equivalent benefit.

Conclusion: The profiteering determinations require fresh evaluation under the project-specific methodology applicable to real-estate projects.

Issues: Whether profiteering in a real-estate project could be determined by comparing the input-tax-credit-to-turnover ratios for the pre-GST and post-GST periods.

Analysis: The input tax credit and buyer collections in a real-estate project do not necessarily accrue uniformly during the project life cycle. A turnover-based comparison therefore lacks a direct correlation with the input tax credit attributable to a particular period. The applicable approach requires computation of the total GST-related savings for each project and allocation of that benefit on a per-square-foot basis, so that buyers of equivalent areas receive equivalent benefit.

Conclusion: The profiteering determination for the real-estate project must be reconsidered using a project-wise methodology based on total savings and per-square-foot allocation of benefit.

Issues: (i) Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation; (ii) whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible; and (iii) whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Issue (i): Whether a single Common Adjudicating Authority should be appointed for all three show cause notices arising from the investigation.

Analysis: Although the notices arose from a common investigation and involved overlapping material, they concerned distinct subject matters, including live intercepted consignments, previously cleared consignments, and goods found at multiple data centres. Two notices had already been adjudicated, and directing common adjudication at this stage would require displacement of that adjudication while its validity was separately under challenge.

Conclusion: Appointment of a single Common Adjudicating Authority for all three notices was declined, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether pendency of the writ petition concerning common adjudication and the order dated 19.08.2025 rendered the adjudication of two show cause notices impermissible.

Analysis: The order dated 19.08.2025 contained prima facie observations and directed adjournment only of the hearing before the Mumbai authority. It did not stay or restrain adjudication of the two notices pending before the competent authority at New Delhi.

Conclusion: The pending writ petition and the order dated 19.08.2025 did not render the New Delhi adjudication without jurisdiction, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether challenges to the orders-in-original, including procedural and limitation objections, should be entertained in writ jurisdiction despite the statutory appeal.

Analysis: Availability of an alternative statutory remedy is not an absolute bar to writ jurisdiction. However, the alleged non-consideration of replies, service of hearing notices, adequacy of hearing, limitation, and related objections required examination of the adjudication record and disputed factual matters. The statutory appellate authority was competent to examine those matters and grant appropriate relief.

Conclusion: Writ jurisdiction was not invoked to determine the procedural, limitation, or substantive objections; those objections may be pursued before the statutory appellate forum, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The merits of the allegations, valuation, duty and penalty liability, limitation, and the individual natural-justice objections remain open for determination in the statutory appellate proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: Where objections to a consolidated customs adjudication depend on disputed facts and examination of the complete record, the statutory appellate remedy should ordinarily be pursued unless an inherent jurisdictional defect or exceptional ground is established.