Contempt needs intentional disobedience; garnishee notice not blocking secured recovery does not amount to wilful breach.

Contempt requires clear, intentional disobedience of a court order; a departmental communication and garnishee notice that do not obstruct sale of the secured asset or prevent recovery by the secured creditor will not amount to wilful breach. On the facts described, the earlier order had recognised the secured creditor's position and permitted realisation from the secured asset, while the impugned notice did not frustrate those rights or disclose deliberate non-compliance. The surrounding conduct and circumstances also negatived any bona fide basis for contempt. The petition was therefore rejected and contempt proceedings were declined.

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Issues: Whether the issuance of the departmental communication and garnishee notice amounted to wilful disobedience of the earlier order so as to justify contempt action.

Analysis: The earlier order recognized the secured creditor's position and permitted realization from the secured asset, but the impugned communication did not obstruct sale of the property or prevent recovery by the secured creditor. The notice dated 9 April 2021 was in the nature of a garnishee notice and did not disclose any deliberate breach of the earlier directions. Contempt jurisdiction requires intentional disobedience, which was absent on the facts. The petitioners' conduct and the surrounding circumstances also negatived any bona fide basis for contempt.

Conclusion: No contempt was made out; the petition was untenable and was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The Court declined to initiate contempt proceedings and held that the departmental notices did not constitute wilful breach of the earlier order.

Ratio Decidendi: Contempt cannot be sustained unless there is clear and intentional disobedience of a court order; a communication or garnishee notice that does not impede the lawful exercise of rights recognized by the court does not amount to contempt.

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