Prior sanction for review is a condition precedent; unauthorized review proceedings cannot be cured by remand for fresh adjudication.

Where the statute and rules make prior written sanction of the Commissioner a condition precedent for review, review proceedings initiated without such sanction and beyond the permitted period are void ab initio and unsustainable in law. An appellate authority cannot cure a jurisdictional defect by remanding such a matter for de novo adjudication, because an order void from inception cannot be legitimised by fresh proceedings. The review orders and the appellate remand orders were therefore quashed, with consequential relief for refund or adjustment of any amount recovered.

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Issues: (i) Whether review proceedings initiated against the petitioner-company were void ab initio for want of previous sanction of the Commissioner and for having been initiated beyond the permitted period. (ii) Whether the appellate authority could validly remand the matter for de novo adjudication when the very initiation of review proceedings was without jurisdiction.

Issue (i): Whether review proceedings initiated against the petitioner-company were void ab initio for want of previous sanction of the Commissioner and for having been initiated beyond the permitted period.

Analysis: Section 9A(4) permits review by the authority passing the order or its successor-in-office, but the power is subject to the Rules. Rule 14(10) bars review after twelve months of the order sought to be reviewed, unless there is previous sanction of the Commissioner recorded in writing. Rule 14(11) further requires previous sanction of the Commissioner where an authority below the rank of Commissioner reviews an order passed by its predecessor in office. The review orders in question were passed without such sanction, and the legal position had already been affirmed in the earlier coordinate bench decision relied upon in the proceedings.

Conclusion: The review proceedings were without jurisdiction and unsustainable in law.

Issue (ii): Whether the appellate authority could validly remand the matter for de novo adjudication when the very initiation of review proceedings was without jurisdiction.

Analysis: An order that is void from its inception cannot be cured by a subsequent remand. Once the initiation itself was found to be impermissible for want of statutory sanction, the appellate authority could not confer jurisdiction on the assessing authority by directing fresh adjudication. The proper course was to set aside the review orders rather than remand the matter.

Conclusion: The remand order was legally unsustainable and liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The review orders and appellate remand orders were quashed, and the petitions were allowed with consequential relief of refund or adjustment of any amount recovered.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statute and rules make prior sanction a condition precedent for review, any review initiated without such sanction is void ab initio and cannot be legitimised by a remand for fresh adjudication.

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