Execution limitation runs from when a contingent decree becomes enforceable, not from the compromise decree date.

Limitation for execution under Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 runs from the date a decree first becomes enforceable, not necessarily from the date of the decree itself. Where a compromise decree makes entitlement contingent on a future event, execution cannot begin until that contingency occurs. Here, the decree-holders' right depended on dispossession and related rights being finally determined, which occurred when the civil court passed the final decree on 31.03.1994. The execution application filed on 17.07.1995 was therefore within the 12-year period, and the appeal failed.

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Issues: Whether limitation for execution of the compromise decree began on the date of the compromise decree or on the date when the decree became enforceable upon final determination of the dispossession and third-party rights.

Analysis: Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides a 12-year period for execution from the date when the decree or order becomes enforceable. A decree may become enforceable on its own date or on a later date if its operative effect is contingent on a future event. The compromise decree in question made the decree-holders' entitlement conditional upon their dispossession, and execution could arise only when that contingency occurred. The final decree passed by the civil court on 31.03.1994 conclusively determined the relevant rights and confirmed the dispossession, thereby making the compromise decree capable of execution only from that date.

Conclusion: The limitation period commenced on 31.03.1994, so the execution application filed on 17.07.1995 was within time. The appeal failed.

Ratio Decidendi: For the purpose of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, 1963, limitation for execution begins when the decree first becomes enforceable, and where enforceability depends on a contingent event, time runs only from the occurrence of that event.

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