Transfer power under criminal procedure survives cheque dishonour jurisdiction rules where common trial avoids contradictory findings.

The Supreme Court's transfer power under Section 406 CrPC is not ousted by the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, because Section 142 governs cognizance and territorial jurisdiction for cheque dishonour offences and does not displace the Court's independent power to transfer cases where justice so requires. Applying that principle, the Court found transfer justified because the complaints arose from the same commercial transaction, separate trials risked inconsistent findings, and most connected matters were already pending at Dwarka, making a common trial convenient for parties and witnesses. The transfer petitions were allowed and the cases were directed to be tried together at Dwarka.

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Issues: (i) Whether the Supreme Court's power to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is excluded by the non obstante clause in Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) Whether transfer of the complaint cases was warranted as they arose out of the same transaction and were pending in different courts.

Issue (i): Whether the Supreme Court's power to transfer criminal cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is excluded by the non obstante clause in Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Analysis: The statutory scheme of Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 governs cognizance and territorial jurisdiction for offences under Section 138, while Sections 142(2) and 142-A were inserted to align jurisdictional rules with the later understanding of place of trial. The non obstante clause in Section 142(1) operates in relation to the manner of taking cognizance and the special procedure under the Act. It does not, by its language or purpose, abrogate the Supreme Court's independent transfer power under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which can still be exercised where expedient for the ends of justice.

Conclusion: The Supreme Court's power under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 remains intact and is not excluded by Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (ii): Whether transfer of the complaint cases was warranted as they arose out of the same transaction and were pending in different courts.

Analysis: All the complaint cases arose from the same commercial transaction and the dishonour of cheques issued under the same arrangement. Trying them separately in different fora could result in inconsistent or contradictory findings. Since more cases were already pending at Dwarka and transfer there would also be convenient to the parties and witnesses, common adjudication would better serve judicial economy and the interests of justice.

Conclusion: Transfer of the Nagpur cases to the Dwarka courts was justified.

Final Conclusion: The transfer petitions were allowed and the pending cases were directed to be tried together in the designated court at Dwarka.

Ratio Decidendi: The Supreme Court may transfer complaint cases under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 notwithstanding the non obstante clause in Section 142(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, where a common trial is necessary to secure the ends of justice and avoid contradictory findings.

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