Separation of powers limits writ courts from creating oversight bodies for FCRA enforcement on speculative misuse alone.

A writ court cannot require the creation of an independent tribunal or committee to supervise enforcement of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 merely because the statute confers wide powers on the Central Government. The presumption is that statutory powers are exercised bona fide, and speculative fears of misuse do not justify judicial substitution of legislative policy. Constitutional validity must be assessed on the statute's provisions and operation, not on conjectural apprehension of future abuse. Ordering a new enforcement body would amount to directing a legislative amendment and would breach separation of powers. The requested relief was therefore not grantable.

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Issues: Whether a writ court can direct the creation of an independent tribunal or committee to oversee enforcement of the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, on the ground that the statute may be misused or influenced by the Central Government.

Analysis: The statutory scheme places significant enforcement powers in the Central Government, including the power to identify political organisations, grant or suspend certification, specify the investigating authority, issue directions, delegate powers, and frame rules. However, the mere width of statutory discretion does not by itself justify judicial substitution of legislative policy. The law proceeds on a presumption that statutory powers are exercised bona fide, and a challenge based only on speculative misuse is insufficient unless concrete material shows actual abuse. The constitutionality of a statute is judged by its provisions and operation, not by conjectural fears of future misuse. Creating a tribunal or committee to supervise enforcement would amount to directing a legislative amendment and would transgress the separation of powers. Courts cannot, by writ, set up an adjudicatory body where the statute does not provide one.

Conclusion: The requested direction to constitute an independent tribunal or committee was not grantable, and the petition failed on the ground that it rested only on apprehension and not on demonstrated illegality.

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