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Issues: Whether proceedings for recovery of short-levied excise duty commenced under the unamended Rule 10 of the Central Excise Rules could continue after substitution of that rule without an express saving clause.
Analysis: The earlier Rule 10 and the substituted Rule 10 were substantially similar in conferring power on the proper officer to issue notice and on the Assistant Collector to determine the duty payable, the principal change being only the period of limitation for issuing notice. The later omission of the substituted rule and introduction of Section 11A of the Central Excises and Salt Act did not alter the substantive basis of the levy or recovery machinery. The reasoning that a proceeding must fail because the old rule ceased to exist was rejected, and the line of authority treating the change as one of continuity rather than repeal or extinction of the recovery power was accepted.
Conclusion: The proceedings validly continued after substitution of Rule 10, and the challenge to their continuation failed.
Final Conclusion: The writ petitions failed because the recovery notices and consequent proceedings were held to be maintainable notwithstanding the substitution of Rule 10 and the absence of a specific saving clause.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a substituted fiscal recovery provision preserves the same enforcement machinery and only alters the limitation period, pending proceedings commenced under the earlier rule do not lapse merely because the rule was replaced.