Concurrent findings on loan execution and cash loan recovery upheld; no second-appeal interference, statutory bar, or cross-examination prejudice found.

Concurrent findings that a plaintiff advanced a loan and that the promissory note was duly executed could not be disturbed in second appeal absent perversity or a substantial question of law. The court accepted oral and documentary evidence proving the loan and held that the defendant failed to show forgery or disprove the signatures. It also held that a solitary loan transaction did not amount to money-lending business, and that Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act did not defeat a recovery claim merely because the loan was taken in cash. Closure of the defendant's cross-examination was upheld because repeated adjournments and lack of diligence showed adequate opportunity had been given.

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Issues: (i) Whether the concurrent findings that the plaintiff advanced Rs.80,000/- to the defendant and that the promissory note was duly executed and not forged could be interfered with in second appeal; (ii) Whether the suit was barred by Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or by the Money Lending Act; (iii) Whether closure of the defendant's right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses vitiated the decree.

Issue (i): Whether the concurrent findings that the plaintiff advanced Rs.80,000/- to the defendant and that the promissory note was duly executed and not forged could be interfered with in second appeal.

Analysis: The oral evidence of the plaintiff and his witnesses was accepted as proving advancement of the loan. The witnesses to the promissory note also proved its execution. The defendant did not discharge the burden of showing that the document was forged or that the signatures were not his. The findings recorded by the courts below were based on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence and no perversity was shown.

Conclusion: The concurrent findings on loan advancement and execution of the promissory note were not open to interference in second appeal.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit was barred by Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or by the Money Lending Act.

Analysis: The transaction was found to be a solitary loan and not a money-lending business, so no licensing requirement was attracted. The court further held that Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 did not apply so as to defeat the recovery claim, and that receipt of the loan in cash could not by itself invalidate the suit.

Conclusion: The suit was not barred by Section 269SS of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or by the Money Lending Act.

Issue (iii): Whether closure of the defendant's right to cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses vitiated the decree.

Analysis: The record showed repeated adjournments and lack of diligence by the defendant. The trial court had granted sufficient opportunity and had earlier imposed costs. On that record, the closure of cross-examination was held not to be illegal.

Conclusion: Closure of the defendant's right to cross-examine did not vitiate the decree.

Final Conclusion: No substantial question of law arose, and the concurrent factual findings sustaining the plaintiff's recovery claim were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In second appeal, concurrent findings of fact based on evidence cannot be interfered with unless a substantial question of law or perversity is shown, and procedural objections unsupported by prejudice do not displace a decree founded on proved loan liability.

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