Mistaken legal advice can justify condonation of delay when the litigant acts bona fide and without negligence.

Mistaken legal advice may constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay where the litigant acted bona fide, with reasonable care, and without negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides. The Court noted that the petitioners first pursued a revision application seeking relief against the confiscation order under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, then filed the appeal, and that the grievance consistently related to the same adjudication. The expression "sufficient cause" was to receive a liberal construction on these facts, so the refusal to condone delay was unsustainable and the delay ought to have been condoned.

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Issues: Whether the delay in filing the appeal against the order under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968 should be condoned.

Analysis: The delay arose because the petitioners, acting on legal advice, first pursued a revision application and thereafter filed the appeal. The original adjudication order was under the Gold (Control) Act, 1968, and the revision application sought return of the confiscated goods and refund of the fine, showing that the grievance related to that order. The Court held that the appellate authority failed to appreciate that the petitioners had acted within time in challenging the order, that the facts under the two enactments were identical, and that mistaken legal advice can constitute sufficient cause. The expression "sufficient cause" was required to receive a liberal construction where no negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides could be attributed to the litigant.

Conclusion: The delay ought to have been condoned and the refusal to condone it was unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: Where a litigant acts bona fide and with reasonable care on wrong legal advice, and no negligence or want of bona fides is shown, such advice may constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay under the law of limitation.

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