Voluntary customs confessions and proof of conspiracy: mere knowledge of smuggling is insufficient, while knowing storage can attract liability.

Statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act were treated as voluntary and admissible because they were written by the accused in their own handwriting and materially differed in content, which negatived the claim of dictated confessions. Liability for a solitary act of knowingly permitting smuggled goods to be stored in a family godown supported conviction under Section 135(b)(i), but did not establish criminal conspiracy; the custodial sentence was reduced to a fine with default imprisonment. For accused No. 20, the statement showed only awareness of others' activities and no incriminating participation, so the conviction and sentence were set aside.

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Issues: (i) Whether the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were voluntary and could be relied upon; (ii) whether accused No. 17 was liable only under Section 135(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and whether the sentence required reduction; (iii) whether the conviction and sentence of accused No. 20 could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether the statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 were voluntary and could be relied upon.

Analysis: The statements were written by the accused in their own handwriting and were found to be materially different in content and detail from one another and from the statement of the deceased accused. Those features supported voluntariness and negatived the claim that the Customs Authorities had dictated the contents of the confessions.

Conclusion: The statements were voluntary and admissible against the makers.

Issue (ii): Whether accused No. 17 was liable only under Section 135(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and whether the sentence required reduction.

Analysis: The statement of accused No. 17 showed knowledge of smuggling activity and a solitary act of permitting contraband to be stored in the family godown for consideration. That conduct supported liability for dealing with smuggled goods but did not establish criminal conspiracy. Taking into account his age and the lapse of time, the custodial sentence was considered excessive and was substituted by a substantial fine.

Conclusion: The conviction of accused No. 17 was restricted to Section 135(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 and the sentence was reduced to a fine of Rs. 5,000/- with a default sentence of two years' simple imprisonment.

Issue (iii): Whether the conviction and sentence of accused No. 20 could be sustained.

Analysis: The statement attributed to accused No. 20 did not contain incriminating material showing his participation in concealment or any criminal agreement. The references in his statement showed, at most, awareness of the activities of others and disapproval of the conduct of accused No. 17, but not his own culpability.

Conclusion: The conviction and sentence of accused No. 20 were not sustainable and were set aside.

Final Conclusion: The appeal succeeded in part by retaining only the lesser customs offence against accused No. 17 with a reduced monetary penalty, while completely exonerating accused No. 20 from the conviction under challenge.

Ratio Decidendi: A voluntary statement under Section 108 of the Customs Act, 1962 may be relied upon, but a conviction for criminal conspiracy requires proof of participation beyond mere knowledge of smuggling, whereas a proved solitary act of knowingly permitting storage of contraband supports liability under the customs provision dealing with concealment or keeping of smuggled goods.

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