Issues: Whether premiums retained on lapse or repudiation of life-insurance policies for non-payment of premium or misdeclaration constitute consideration for a declared service of agreeing to tolerate an act under Section 66E(e) of the Finance Act, 1994.

Analysis: The insurance contract became void or lapsed upon the specified defaults, with no surrender value or benefit becoming payable where the policy was not revived. Retention of amounts already paid was an incident of the original insurance arrangement and not a distinct agreement under which the insurer undertook, for consideration, to tolerate a default or situation. A declared service under Section 66E(e) requires an independent contractual obligation specifically covering the act of refraining, tolerating, or doing an act, together with a necessary nexus and flow of consideration for that obligation. Treating the retained premium as consideration for a separate declared service would also result in double taxation.

Conclusion: The retained premiums are not taxable as consideration for agreeing to tolerate an act; the service-tax demand, interest, and penalties are unsustainable.

Issues: (i) Whether CGST authorities could invoke Section 74(1) to deny transitional credit on the basis that CENVAT credit validly carried in pre-GST returns was inadmissible under the erstwhile regime; (ii) Whether Krishi Kalyan Cess credit transitioned under Section 140(1) was admissible; (iii) Whether VAT credit on stock-in-trade transitioned under Section 140(6) could be denied without contrary material or specific findings.

Issue (i): Whether CGST authorities could invoke Section 74(1) to deny transitional credit on the basis that CENVAT credit validly carried in pre-GST returns was inadmissible under the erstwhile regime.

Analysis: Sections 142(6)(a) and 174(2)(e) preserve proceedings and remedies under the erstwhile enactments. The credit in question stood disclosed as closing balance in the pre-GST service-tax and VAT returns and had never been disputed under those laws. Section 140 permits carry-forward subject to GST eligibility conditions, but does not empower CGST officers to reassess the correctness of credit availed under the repealed regime. Verification of closing credit against particular invoices was also untenable because the closing balance is derived from opening balance, availment and utilisation. Proceedings for alleged wrong availment under the erstwhile regime could only be initiated under the applicable erstwhile law.

Conclusion: The Section 74(1) proceedings, insofar as they reassessed the admissibility of pre-GST credit under the erstwhile laws, were without jurisdiction and were decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Krishi Kalyan Cess credit transitioned under Section 140(1) was admissible.

Analysis: Explanation 3 to Section 140 could not be applied to deny cess credit under Section 140(1) in the absence of operationalisation of the linked amendments to Explanations 1 and 2. The departmental circular confirmed that those amendments would not be notified. The jurisdictional High Court ruling governing the effect of these provisions remained operative, and the pending challenge against it did not justify denial in the absence of a stay.

Conclusion: Transition of Krishi Kalyan Cess credit was valid and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether VAT credit on stock-in-trade transitioned under Section 140(6) could be denied without contrary material or specific findings.

Analysis: The required particulars for stock-in-trade VAT credit had been furnished, while the lower authorities recorded no specific defect or evidence disproving eligibility. The denial merely treated this credit as part of other disputed credits. Objections concerning invoice particulars and documents, not raised when the underlying credit was claimed, could not sustain denial at the transition stage.

Conclusion: The transitioned VAT credit on stock-in-trade was eligible and was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The transitional credits were legally available, and the demand, interest and penalty founded on their denial could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: Transitional-credit provisions do not confer jurisdiction on GST authorities to reassess the admissibility of credit validly carried forward from the erstwhile regime; such disputes must be pursued under the saved provisions of the applicable erstwhile law.

Issues: Whether punitive action against an authorised courier was justified for alleged contravention connected with a consignment containing ingeniously concealed gold.

Analysis: The inquiry findings established that the masterminds of the smuggling had been identified and that no evidence implicated the authorised courier or showed its knowledge of the concealed gold. The declared goods did not disclose the concealment, which could be detected only through Customs X-ray examination; the courier lacked comparable facilities at the stage of receiving the cargo. The courier had acted bona fide and exercised due diligence to secure compliance. The separate proposed penalty under Section 112(a) and Section 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 had also been dropped.

Conclusion: The authorised courier had not wilfully contravened its regulatory obligations and was not liable to punitive measures under Regulation 14; the finding dropping the proceedings warranted no interference.

Ratio Decidendi: An authorised courier cannot be subjected to punitive action for concealed contraband absent evidence of knowledge, wilful contravention, or failure to exercise due diligence, particularly where the concealment was not reasonably detectable.

Issues: (i) Whether appointment of a liquidator without considering the Committee of Creditors' unanimous recommendation was sustainable; (ii) Whether the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 justified bypassing the recommended insolvency professional; (iii) Whether the objection concerning the appellant's Authorisation for Assignment could sustain the appointment; (iv) Whether progress by the incumbent liquidator and the asserted absence of creditor objection warranted refusal of relief.

Issue (i): Whether appointment of a liquidator without considering the Committee of Creditors' unanimous recommendation was sustainable.

Analysis: Section 34 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 treats continuation of the resolution professional as liquidator as the default, subject to the specified grounds for replacement. The unanimous and repeatedly affirmed recommendation of the sole Committee of Creditors member was material to selection of the liquidator. The impugned order referred to the relevant Committee meeting only for fixation of fees and did not acknowledge or address its recommendation of the appellant.

Conclusion: The appointment made without consideration of the Committee of Creditors' unanimous recommendation was unsustainable, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the IBBI communication dated 18.07.2023 justified bypassing the recommended insolvency professional.

Analysis: The power under Section 34(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits replacement on grounds relating to a particular resolution professional and cannot be transformed into a general exclusion of erstwhile insolvency resolution professionals from appointment as liquidators. In any event, the communication targeting an outgoing interim resolution professional or resolution professional did not apply because the appellant had never held either office in the corporate debtor.

Conclusion: The communication did not furnish a valid basis for appointing another liquidator in place of the appellant, in favour of the appellant.

Issue (iii): Whether the objection concerning the appellant's Authorisation for Assignment could sustain the appointment.

Analysis: The eligibility objection was not part of the reasoning in the impugned order. The material concerning the appellant's AFA was contested, and the appellate record did not permit a conclusive determination of its validity. Regulation 7A of the IBBI (Insolvency Professionals) Regulations, 2016 nevertheless required verification before the appellant assumed charge.

Conclusion: The AFA objection could not sustain the impugned appointment; the appellant's current AFA must be verified by the Adjudicating Authority before assumption of charge.

Issue (iv): Whether progress by the incumbent liquidator and the asserted absence of creditor objection warranted refusal of relief.

Analysis: The incumbent's actions were routine statutory liquidation steps, while realisation of assets had remained stayed shortly after his appointment. Those acts were neither irreversible nor sufficient to override the sole financial creditor's unequivocal, repeated recommendation of the appellant. The completed steps could be adopted by the incoming liquidator, and the incumbent was entitled to appropriate costs and fees for work genuinely performed.

Conclusion: Neither the progress made nor the asserted absence of objection justified retaining the incumbent liquidator, in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The liquidator's appointment was required to conform to the unanimously expressed commercial decision of the Committee of Creditors, subject to verification of the proposed liquidator's subsisting regulatory authorisation and preservation of valid steps already undertaken.

Ratio Decidendi: A liquidator cannot be appointed by disregarding a unanimous Committee of Creditors recommendation on the basis of a general communication that is outside the confines of Section 34(4) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 or factually inapplicable to the recommended professional.

Issues: (i) Whether service tax was leviable on construction and sale of residential flats, substantially undertaken before 01.07.2010, under Construction of Residential Complex Service; (ii) Whether the extended limitation period, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Issue (i): Whether service tax was leviable on construction and sale of residential flats, substantially undertaken before 01.07.2010, under Construction of Residential Complex Service.

Analysis: Composite construction agreements did not contain a statutory mechanism for segregating goods and service components during the relevant period. The settled position concerning builders' construction for prospective purchasers before 01.07.2010 did not permit the proposed levy on composite consideration. The construction was also for individual purchasers' personal use, attracting the exclusion from the meaning of residential complex, supported by the applicable departmental clarification.

Conclusion: The service-tax demand on the construction activity was unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period, interest and penalties could be sustained.

Analysis: The assessee was registered and filed statutory returns, while the dispute arose from an unsettled and interpretational question concerning the taxable entry and departmental clarification. Mere non-payment in those circumstances did not establish deliberate suppression or wilful misstatement with intent to evade tax. As the substantive demand failed, consequential interest and penalties could not survive; the bona fide interpretational dispute also warranted the statutory penalty protection.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended period was invalid, and the consequential interest and penalties were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service-tax liability and its consequential fiscal imposts were annulled; payment of the late fee is to be verified and adjusted if established.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite pre-01.07.2010 construction transaction cannot be subjected to the proposed service-tax levy where the legal framework did not provide for segregation of goods and service value; an interpretational dispute without deliberate suppression cannot justify the extended limitation period or penalties.

Issues: (i) Whether the sub-contractor's earthwork and site-formation activities qualified as works contract service eligible for exemption under Serial No. 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012; (ii) Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.

Issue (i): Whether the sub-contractor's earthwork and site-formation activities qualified as works contract service eligible for exemption under Serial No. 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012.

Analysis: Serial No. 29(h) exempts works contract services supplied by a sub-contractor to a contractor supplying exempt works contract services. The main contractor's work relating to construction of dams and canals for the State Government was undisputedly exempt; the sole question was whether the appellant supplied works contract service. Under Section 65B(54) of the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant requirement is that property in goods involved in executing the contract is leviable to tax as a sale of goods, not that goods must be separately supplied, billed, or actually subjected to VAT. The contract was composite, requiring the appellant to provide machinery, labour, fuel, lubricants, spares and other materials for excavation and earthwork. Goods used and consumed in execution may pass in an altered form by accretion and constitute a deemed sale. Non-payment of VAT because of an available exemption, and subsequent reimbursement of VAT deducted by the main contractor, did not alter the works-contract character of the activity.

Conclusion: The activities were works contract services and qualified for exemption under Serial No. 29(h) of Notification No. 25/2012-ST dated 20.06.2012, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the service-tax demand.

Analysis: The dispute involved interpretation of exemptions applicable to Government dam and canal works, the nature of works contract service, and the VAT treatment of goods used in execution. The appellant could reasonably hold a bona fide belief that no service tax was payable. The managing director's statement concerning absence of transfer of goods reflected an interpretation of the arrangement and was not cogent evidence of deliberate suppression or intent to evade tax. The finding that the managing director lacked complicity or active planning to evade tax also undermined the allegation of intentional suppression by the company. No independent positive evidence established suppression with intent to evade.

Conclusion: The extended period was not invocable; the demand was time-barred, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The service-tax demand failed both because the subcontracted activity was exempt works contract service and because the extended limitation period was unavailable; consequential penalties could not survive.

Ratio Decidendi: A composite subcontract requiring use of goods in execution is a works contract where property in those goods passes in any form by accretion, and non-payment of VAT under an exemption does not negate its character as a deemed sale; a bona fide interpretative dispute without positive evidence of intent to evade precludes invocation of the extended limitation period.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant's labour contract constituted taxable manpower recruitment or supply service rather than job work or a manufacturing contract; (ii) whether the extended limitation period, demand based on Form 16A receipts, and penalty were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant's labour contract constituted taxable manpower recruitment or supply service rather than job work or a manufacturing contract.

Analysis: The work order, read as a whole, appointed the appellant as a labour contractor, described the activities to be performed by labour, required submission and payment of labour bills, and required compliance documentation concerning the workers' PF and ESIC contributions. Payment calculated per metric tonne did not alter the essential nature of the arrangement as labour supply. The contract contained no output-quality standards, production benchmarks, or consequences for failure to achieve them that would indicate an independent job-work contract. The appellant's unretracted investigation statement also confirmed that it acted as a labour contractor. Section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944 did not require exclusion of the appellant's own statement in the circumstances, since the appellant had failed to avail repeated hearing opportunities.

Conclusion: The activity was taxable manpower recruitment or supply service, and the service-tax demand was sustainable, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the extended limitation period, demand based on Form 16A receipts, and penalty were sustainable.

Analysis: The appellant knew that it provided labour-supply service but did not disclose and pay tax on that taxable activity. In the absence of complete records from the appellant, the receipts reflected in Form 16A could be relied upon; the appellant did not establish that those receipts related to any non-taxable activity. These facts justified invocation of the extended period and the penalty for non-payment of service tax.

Conclusion: Invocation of the extended limitation period, computation of demand using Form 16A receipts, and penalty under Section 78 of the Finance Act, 1994 were sustainable, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confirmed service-tax liability, interest, and Section 78 penalty remained enforceable.

Ratio Decidendi: The true character of a service arrangement is determined from the contract read as a whole; payment measured by output does not displace its character as manpower supply where the contractual obligations and surrounding evidence establish supply of labour.

Issues: Whether Cenvat credit is admissible on services, inputs and capital goods used for maintenance and operation of a fly ash pond and for loading, unloading and transportation of fly ash to the manufacturing unit, notwithstanding that such services were rendered outside the factory premises.

Analysis: Rule 2(l) of the Cenvat Credit Rules, 2004 covers services used directly or indirectly in or in relation to manufacture and includes procurement and inward transportation of inputs. Fly ash was an undisputed raw material for cement manufacture. The pond-related maintenance and extraction activities, as well as loading, unloading and freight for bringing fly ash to the factory, had a direct nexus with manufacture. The definition does not require that every eligible input service must be performed within the factory premises. The post-1 April 2011 omission of setting-up services from the inclusive portion does not exclude services otherwise covered by the principal part of the definition.

Conclusion: Cenvat credit on the disputed fly ash pond-related services, inputs, capital goods, and inward movement services is admissible. The issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Ratio Decidendi: A service used directly or indirectly in relation to manufacture qualifies as an input service under Rule 2(l) even when performed outside the factory, unless specifically excluded.

Issues: Whether the substituted proviso to Section 107(6) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, effective from 01.10.2025, requiring a ten per cent pre-deposit for appeals against penalty-only orders, applies to adjudicatory proceedings initiated by a show-cause notice before that date.

Analysis: The right of appeal is a substantive right that vests with the commencement of the lis and includes the appellate forum and conditions governing exercise of that right. A subsequently introduced pre-deposit that materially burdens access to the appellate remedy cannot apply to a vested appellate right unless the amending enactment expressly or by necessary implication so provides. The lis commenced when the show-cause notice asserted quantified personal penalty liability and required an answer; subsequent replies, hearing, adjudication order, and filing of appeal were connected stages of the same proceeding. The substituted proviso introduced, for the first time in respect of the penalty-only order concerned, a mandatory ten per cent deposit as a condition precedent to filing an appeal. Neither Section 129 of the Finance Act, 2025 nor the substituted proviso contains an express transitional command or necessary implication applying that onerous condition to proceedings initiated before its commencement. The expression "no appeal shall be filed" specifies the stage of compliance where the substituted proviso applies, but does not determine its temporal applicability to an already vested appellate right.

Conclusion: The substituted proviso to Section 107(6) does not apply to appeals arising from the pre-01.10.2025 show-cause notice; the appeals are governed by the pre-amendment appellate regime, and no ten per cent deposit of the disputed penalties is required as a condition of filing them. This is in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether an appeal challenging classification and taxability of services was maintainable before the High Court under Section 35G(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: Section 35G(1) excludes High Court jurisdiction over Tribunal orders relating to determination of questions having a relation to the rate of duty or value for assessment. Classification of services bears a direct and proximate relation to the applicable rate of duty. Section 35L(2) clarifies that questions of taxability or excisability fall within questions relating to the rate of duty, and this clarification operates declaratorily. The proposed questions themselves concerned classification and taxability of the secondment arrangements; the contrary precedent relied upon concerned materially different facts.

Conclusion: The appeal was not maintainable under Section 35G(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944; an appeal on the classification and taxability questions lay before the Supreme Court under Section 35L of that Act.

Issues: (i) Whether disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income was sustainable; (ii) Whether CENVAT credit could reduce profits eligible for deduction under section 80-IA; (iii) Whether corporate advertisement expenditure was capital or revenue; (iv) Whether lease equalisation charges computed under Accounting Standard 19 were deductible; (v) Whether investment allowance was available for plant and machinery reflected as capital work-in-progress before 01.04.2013 but installed during the relevant year; (vi) Whether corporate-guarantee commission at 0.5% represented the arm's length price; (vii) Whether the electricity tariff paid by the non-eligible unit to the distribution licensee was a valid comparable for captive-power transfers; (viii) Whether negative net worth must be considered in computing slump-sale capital gains; (ix) Whether education cess was deductible; (x) Whether the additional claim for treaty-rate dividend distribution tax could be admitted; (xi) Whether incentive and subsidy claims as capital receipts required fresh examination; (xii) Whether CENVAT credit required an adjustment to stock valuation; (xiii) Whether actuarially determined leave-salary provision was allowable; (xiv) Whether employees' children school-fee payments were allowable; (xv) Whether balance additional depreciation was allowable in the succeeding year; (xvi) Whether employee stock-option expenditure was deductible; (xvii) Whether depreciation on acquired goodwill was allowable; (xviii) Whether Technology Upgradation Fund interest subsidy was a capital receipt; (xix) Whether head-office expenses were allocable to captive-power-unit profits.

Issue (i): Whether disallowance of expenditure relating to exempt income was sustainable.

Analysis: Application of Rule 8D(2)(iii) requires a recorded dissatisfaction, having regard to the accounts, with the correctness of the assessee's own disallowance. The recorded reasons were general and identical to those rejected in earlier years, without examining the working of the voluntary disallowance. Further, where own interest-free funds exceeded the investments, a presumption applied that investments were made from those funds.

Conclusion: Disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(iii) was restricted to the voluntary disallowance, and no interest disallowance under Rule 8D(2)(ii) was warranted. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether CENVAT credit could reduce profits eligible for deduction under section 80-IA.

Analysis: Under standalone computation of the eligible unit, any adjustment for expenditure generating CENVAT credit must be accompanied by a corresponding credit for the benefit availed by the non-eligible unit. Net accounting of eligible-unit expenses did not distort eligible profits where the corresponding credit was fully availed by other units.

Conclusion: CENVAT credit could not be added back to reduce the section 80-IA deduction. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether corporate advertisement expenditure was capital or revenue.

Analysis: Corporate advertising was incurred to promote products, reputation, sales and business operations and did not create a distinct capital asset.

Conclusion: Corporate advertisement expenditure was revenue expenditure. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether lease equalisation charges computed under Accounting Standard 19 were deductible.

Analysis: Lease equalisation charges arising under the consistently followed Accounting Standard 19 method represented an accrued liability determined on a scientific basis. Corresponding credits in later years had also been brought to tax.

Conclusion: Lease equalisation charges were allowable as a deduction. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (v): Whether investment allowance was available for plant and machinery reflected as capital work-in-progress before 01.04.2013 but installed during the relevant year.

Analysis: Acquisition of a plant or machinery for section 32AC is completed when its components are integrated, installed and commissioned as a functional asset, rather than on purchase of isolated components. The proviso to section 32AC(1A), though subsequently enacted, was treated as curative and as recognising allowance in the year of installation where acquisition and installation occur in different years.

Conclusion: Investment allowance was available for the qualifying plant and machinery installed during the year. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (vi): Whether corporate-guarantee commission at 0.5% represented the arm's length price.

Analysis: The consistent benchmark adopted in earlier years on identical facts fixed the arm's length guarantee commission at 0.5% of the guaranteed amount.

Conclusion: The arm's length price of the corporate guarantee was 0.5%. This issue was decided against both the assessee's claim for a lower rate and the Revenue's claim for a higher rate.

Issue (vii): Whether the electricity tariff paid by the non-eligible unit to the distribution licensee was a valid comparable for captive-power transfers.

Analysis: The regulated tariff actually paid by the manufacturing unit to an independent distribution licensee was an appropriate internal comparable uncontrolled price for electricity supplied by the captive power plant, particularly where there were no third-party sales at another rate.

Conclusion: The captive-power transfer price based on the distribution-licensee tariff was accepted without downward adjustment. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (viii): Whether negative net worth must be considered in computing slump-sale capital gains.

Analysis: The binding Special Bench position requiring consideration of negative net worth remained operative despite the pendency of a further appeal.

Conclusion: Negative net worth was required to be considered in computing capital gains on slump sale. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ix): Whether education cess was deductible.

Analysis: The claim was governed by the controlling Supreme Court position on the non-deductibility of education cess.

Conclusion: Education cess was not allowable as a deduction. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (x): Whether the additional claim for treaty-rate dividend distribution tax could be admitted.

Analysis: Treaty relief depended on taxpayer-specific evidence, including tax-residency documentation and prescribed particulars, which was not on record before the lower authorities. The claim was therefore not a pure legal question arising from existing facts.

Conclusion: The additional ground seeking treaty-rate dividend distribution tax was not admitted. This issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (xi): Whether incentive and subsidy claims as capital receipts required fresh examination.

Analysis: Characterisation of the export incentives, fertilizer subsidy, freight subsidy and sales-tax subsidy depended upon the terms, conditions and purpose of each specific scheme. Those matters had not been examined by the assessing authority.

Conclusion: The claims for treatment as capital receipts and consequential book-profit exclusion were admitted and remitted for de novo examination. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Issue (xii): Whether CENVAT credit required an adjustment to stock valuation.

Analysis: Consistent exclusive-method accounting did not affect net profit when compared with inclusive-method accounting, provided corresponding adjustments were made to all relevant components. No contrary factual basis was shown.

Conclusion: No separate stock-valuation adjustment for CENVAT credit was warranted. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xiii): Whether actuarially determined leave-salary provision was allowable.

Analysis: The provision for non-retiring employees was actuarially valued and represented an accrued liability; it was not presently payable so as to attract the payment condition applicable to leave encashment.

Conclusion: The provision for leave salary was allowable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xiv): Whether employees' children school-fee payments were allowable.

Analysis: Payments for school fees at remote locations were employee-welfare expenditure incurred to attract and retain employees and were not impermissible contributions within section 40A(9).

Conclusion: The school-fee payments were allowable business expenditure. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xv): Whether balance additional depreciation was allowable in the succeeding year.

Analysis: Where assets were put to use for less than 180 days in the preceding year, the unabsorbed balance of additional depreciation remained allowable in the succeeding year.

Conclusion: The balance additional depreciation was allowable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xvi): Whether employee stock-option expenditure was deductible.

Analysis: Discount under the employee stock-option plan was employee cost, deductible over the vesting period, and was not merely a notional or capital loss.

Conclusion: Employee stock-option expenditure was allowable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xvii): Whether depreciation on acquired goodwill was allowable.

Analysis: Acquired goodwill qualified as a depreciable intangible asset under the settled position applied in the assessee's earlier years.

Conclusion: Depreciation on acquired goodwill was allowable. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xviii): Whether Technology Upgradation Fund interest subsidy was a capital receipt.

Analysis: The purpose of the subsidy was technology upgradation and capital investment in the textile sector, rather than supplementation of operational profits.

Conclusion: The Technology Upgradation Fund interest subsidy was a capital receipt. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (xix): Whether head-office expenses were allocable to captive-power-unit profits.

Analysis: The captive power plants maintained separate accounts, and no direct and proximate nexus was established between head-office expenditure and their eligible profits. Allocation merely by turnover was unsupported.

Conclusion: Head-office expenses could not be allocated to reduce captive-power-unit profits eligible for deduction. This issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxable computation must give effect to the allowed claims, retain the disallowances sustained against the assessee, maintain the corporate-guarantee benchmark, and be freshly determined on the remanded incentive and subsidy claims.

Ratio Decidendi: Rule-based disallowance requires a reasoned dissatisfaction with the assessee's accounts; statutory incentive deductions and transfer prices must be determined through commercially realistic standalone and comparable-price analysis; and subsidy character depends on the purpose and conditions of the scheme.

Issues: Whether the assessee was entitled to credit of the entire tax deducted at source reflected against his PAN, despite having offered only his one-third share of jointly earned rental income to tax.

Analysis: The entire TDS was deducted and reported under the assessee's PAN, while the rental income was shared equally among three co-owners. The other co-owners had disclosed their respective shares of rental income but had neither claimed TDS credit nor asserted entitlement to it, and supported the assessee's claim. Rule 37BA(2)(i) permits credit to a person other than the deductee only where the prescribed declaration and reporting conditions are fulfilled; those conditions were not met. Denial of the balance credit would result in the Revenue retaining TDS for which no co-owner could obtain credit. Procedural requirements must advance, rather than defeat, substantive justice.

Conclusion: The assessee is entitled to credit for the entire TDS deducted under his PAN, including the balance two-thirds amount; the issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether penalty for failure to obtain tax audit could be sustained where the assessee had explained the nature of receipts and reasonable cause for non-audit.

Analysis: The reassessment accepted the returned commission income without any addition. In the penalty proceedings, the assessee furnished relevant material explaining that the bank deposits represented sale proceeds of milk pouches and that only commission or trade discount constituted her income. The explanation and the reasonable cause for non-audit were not considered by the lower authorities. Section 273B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 precludes penalty where reasonable cause is established.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 271B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was not sustainable and was directed to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether a common show-cause notice under Section 74 covering multiple tax periods is permissible, and whether challenge to an order-in-original and appellate order should be pursued before the statutory appellate forum.

Analysis: The earlier quashing of the proceedings rested on the view that a common show-cause notice could not cover multiple tax periods. The applicable coordinate-bench decision established that such a common notice is permissible and restored notices and original orders. Since the assessee had also challenged the order-in-original and appellate order, the appropriate remedy lay in an appeal before the Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Conclusion: A common show-cause notice covering multiple tax periods is permissible; the assessee must pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the original and appellate orders. The issue is decided in favour of the Revenue.

Issues: Whether the Tribunal could constitute a Larger Bench to examine the applicability of a binding judgment of the jurisdictional High Court concerning refund under Section 142(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Analysis: A judgment of the jurisdictional High Court binds all tribunals and authorities within its territorial jurisdiction unless it is stayed, reversed or overruled by the Supreme Court. The existence of a contrary judgment of another High Court, and the pendency of a special leave petition against the jurisdictional judgment with an interim order, did not empower the Tribunal to constitute a Larger Bench to examine the correctness or applicability of the binding jurisdictional precedent. In the circumstances, the appropriate course was to defer the pending appeal until the Supreme Court determines the special leave petition.

Conclusion: The direction constituting a Larger Bench was impermissible and was set aside; the pending Tribunal appeal shall remain deferred until final determination of the related special leave petition by the Supreme Court.

Issues: (i) Whether the appellant could be directed to disclose assets and restrained from dealing with them from the commencement of the New York proceedings; (ii) Whether the foreign judgments required fresh adjudication under the Code of Civil Procedure before interim disclosure relief could be granted.

Issue (i): Whether the appellant could be directed to disclose assets and restrained from dealing with them from the commencement of the New York proceedings.

Analysis: The commencement date of the New York litigation was ascertainable as 6 June 2018. The record disclosed the appellant's controlling role in the corporate group, findings of civil contempt in the foreign proceedings, and conduct involving diversion of funds and non-compliance with turnover directions. Asset disclosure was procedural and aimed at identifying assets for prospective protective relief; it did not itself determine whether any particular asset was attachable. The challenge to the Single Judge's interlocutory discretion disclosed no arbitrariness, caprice, perversity, or disregard of settled principles.

Conclusion: The retrospective disclosure direction and restraint against dealing with assets were justified. The finding is against the appellant.

Issue (ii): Whether the foreign judgments required fresh adjudication under the Code of Civil Procedure before interim disclosure relief could be granted.

Analysis: A foreign judgment is conclusive on matters directly adjudicated, subject to the statutory exceptions, and production of a certified copy attracts a presumption of jurisdiction. The appellant produced no credible material to establish want of jurisdiction. Having previously instituted proceedings seeking to restrain enforcement of the same foreign judgment and turnover order, the appellant was estopped from asserting ignorance of, or demanding prior re-adjudication of, those judgments as a condition for disclosure.

Conclusion: Fresh adjudication of the foreign judgments was not a prerequisite to the interim disclosure relief. The finding is against the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The interim protective measures remain operative, and the challenge to the discretionary order fails.

Ratio Decidendi: A certified foreign judgment carries a statutory presumption of competent jurisdiction unless rebutted, and an appellate court will not displace a reasoned interlocutory exercise of discretion absent arbitrariness, perversity, or disregard of settled principles.

Issues: Whether certification under Rule 89(2)(m) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 can be insisted upon for a claim of interest on refund amounts already sanctioned and disbursed.

Analysis: The claim concerned only interest accruing on delayed disbursement of principal refund amounts that had already been allowed for the relevant tax periods. Rule 89(2)(m) requires a certificate regarding non-passing of the incidence of tax, interest or other amount where the refund claim exceeds the prescribed threshold. In the circumstances of a claim confined to interest on refund already sanctioned in favour of the applicant, such certification was not required. The refund particulars and interest claim nevertheless required scrutiny by the Proper Officer.

Conclusion: Certification under Rule 89(2)(m) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 shall not be insisted upon for the claim of interest on the already sanctioned refund; the Proper Officer must scrutinise and decide the interest claim in accordance with law.

Issues: Whether the petitioner should be permitted to pursue the statutory appellate remedy against the impugned GST adjudication order.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of by granting liberty to file an appeal within two weeks with statutory pre-deposit and an application for condonation of delay.