Constitutional scrutiny of slum rehabilitation compensation and acquisition delay requires full review of the statutory scheme.

Constitutional scrutiny of Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 was said to require examination of the Act's object, scheme, Article 31C and the presumption of constitutionality, rather than summary invalidation on an incomplete record. The text also states that the compensation method based on three hundred times property tax needed fuller consideration by the High Court. On acquisition under Section 17, it records that mere delay between the preliminary notice and final notification did not by itself cause lapsing in a continuing welfare scheme, absent an express statutory lapsing provision, though the reasonableness of delay was left open for reconsideration.

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Issues: (i) Whether Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 could be finally struck down on the present record, and whether the matter required reconsideration by the High Court. (ii) Whether the acquisition initiated under Section 17 of the 1973 Act had lapsed merely because of the time gap between the preliminary notice and the final notification.

Issue (i): Whether Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 could be finally struck down on the present record, and whether the matter required reconsideration by the High Court.

Analysis: The challenge to the compensation scheme under Section 20 raised questions about the legislative object of the Act, the applicability of Article 31C, the presumption of constitutionality, and whether payment at three hundred times the property tax was an illusory or unreasonable method of determining compensation. The record showed that the High Court had disposed of this constitutional question without a full analysis of the statutory scheme and the relevant constitutional issues. The Court held that such a question could not be conclusively determined in that manner and that the matter required reconsideration on a fuller record, with liberty to amend pleadings and place additional material before the High Court.

Conclusion: The striking down of Section 20 was not sustained, and the question of its validity was remitted for fresh consideration.

Issue (ii): Whether the acquisition initiated under Section 17 of the 1973 Act had lapsed merely because of the time gap between the preliminary notice and the final notification.

Analysis: The scheme of the 1973 Act was treated as one involving a continuing public obligation to develop slum areas and rehabilitate slum dwellers. In the absence of an express statutory provision for lapsing comparable to the Land Acquisition Act, mere passage of time between the show-cause notice and the final notification could not, by itself, invalidate the acquisition process. At the same time, the broader plea that power must be exercised within a reasonable time was left open for examination by the High Court on remand.

Conclusion: The acquisition did not lapse merely by efflux of time, though the reasonableness of delay remained open for reconsideration.

Final Conclusion: The impugned judgments were set aside and the writ petitions were restored to the High Court for fresh adjudication on all open issues, including the constitutional validity of Section 20 and any newly raised plea regarding Section 17.

Ratio Decidendi: A constitutional challenge to a statutory compensation scheme must be examined on a full consideration of the Act's object, scheme, and constitutional setting, and an acquisition under a continuing welfare statute does not lapse merely because time has passed in the absence of an express provision for lapsing.

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