Defence evidence in cheque dishonour cases cannot be denied solely because the accused admits the signature on the cheque.

An accused in a cheque dishonour prosecution is ordinarily entitled under Section 243(2) CrPC to summon defence evidence after entering upon defence, unless the request is shown to be vexatious, dilatory, or contrary to the ends of justice, with reasons recorded. Admitted signature on the cheque does not by itself bar expert examination where the defence is that the cheque body or particulars were filled by another person or the instrument was misused. The accused remains entitled to lead evidence to rebut the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and the refusal of handwriting and fingerprint expert evidence solely because the signature was admitted was unsustainable.

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Issues: Whether the accused in a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments Act was entitled, after entering upon defence, to summon a handwriting and fingerprint expert to examine the cheque and whether the trial court could refuse that request merely because the signature on the cheque stood admitted.

Analysis: The governing principle under Section 243(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is that an accused must ordinarily be permitted to summon defence evidence after entering upon defence, unless the application is shown to be vexatious, intended to delay the trial, or meant to defeat the ends of justice, with reasons recorded. The admitted signature on a cheque does not by itself foreclose a defence that the body of the cheque or particulars were filled by another person or misused, because the accused is still entitled to attempt rebuttal of the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. A request for expert examination at the defence stage, when aimed at supporting such rebuttal, is part of the right to a fair trial and cannot be rejected solely on the ground that the cheque was signed by the accused.

Conclusion: The request to examine the handwriting and fingerprint expert ought to have been allowed; the refusal was unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The impugned order was set aside and the accused was permitted to lead the proposed defence evidence, leaving the trial court to proceed accordingly.

Ratio Decidendi: An accused facing prosecution on a cheque dishonour complaint has a right to lead defence evidence to rebut the statutory presumptions, and an application for expert examination of the cheque at the defence stage cannot be refused merely because the signature is admitted, unless the court records that the request is vexatious, dilatory, or contrary to the ends of justice.

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