Procedural hearing requirement under Section 143 NI Act held directory; quashing refused for alleged summons-trial irregularity.

Non-compliance with the proviso to Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in changing a cheque dishonour matter to a summons trial did not, on this record, justify quashing under Section 482 CrPC. The Court treated the hearing requirement as procedural and directory, noting that "in the course of" a summary trial is wider than the commencement stage. It found the order was passed before the trial had effectively commenced, no real prejudice was shown, and the case had already progressed substantially, including recording of the accused's Section 313 statement. The belated objection was also viewed as an attempt to delay the proceedings, and quashing was refused.

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Issues: Whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in deciding to try the complaint as a summons case, and the absence of prior hearing, vitiated the proceedings so as to justify quashing under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 permits summary trial of cheque dishonour cases and enables the Magistrate, at the commencement of or in the course of a summary trial, to switch to the manner of a regular trial after hearing the parties. The use of the expression "in the course of" was treated as wider than the commencement stage, and the provision was read as directory in its procedural requirement of hearing, not as one creating an automatic vitiating consequence for every departure. The order directing trial as a summons case was passed before the trial had effectively commenced and before any witness recall issue arose. The Court further held that the petitioner had not shown real prejudice, particularly when the case had already progressed substantially and the statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 had been recorded. The belated challenge was also found to be an attempt to delay the proceedings. The cited authorities were distinguished on the basis that they did not mandate quashing or a de novo trial merely because the Magistrate had not followed the second proviso with complete rigidity.

Conclusion: The non-compliance complained of did not vitiate the proceedings, and the petition for quashing was rejected.

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