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Issues: Whether rubber tubing and rubber sleeving used in the manufacture of detonators were covered by Notification No. 197/67-C.E. dated 29.08.1967 so as to qualify for exemption from excise duty.
Analysis: The exemption applied to piping and tubing designed to be converted in the factory of manufacture into component parts of machinery articles, provided such component parts did not perform the function of conveying air, gas or liquids. The decisive question was whether detonators could be treated as machinery. Reading the ordinary meanings of "machine", "machinery" and "detonator", the Court held that a detonator is a contrivance or apparatus for causing explosion and therefore answers to the description of machinery. Since the petitioner's products were admittedly used in the manufacture of detonators and were not shown to be used for conveying air, gas or liquids, they fell within the notification. The Court also noted the lack of any effective denial to the plea that similar products of another manufacturer had been granted the same exemption.
Conclusion: The petitioner was entitled to exemption from excise duty on the rubber tubing and rubber sleeving under the notification.
Final Conclusion: The impugned orders refusing exemption were quashed and the exemption claim was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: A product used as an essential part in a detonator can qualify as a component part of machinery for the purpose of an exemption notification, and the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the notification must govern where the statute does not define them.